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Abstract
Several works have shown unconditional hardness (via integrality gaps) of computing equi-
libria using strong hierarchies of convex relaxations. Such results however only apply to the
problem of computing equilibria that optimize a certain objective function and not to the (ar-
guably more fundamental) task of finding any equilibrium.
We present an algorithmic model based on the sum-of-squares (SoS) hierarchy that allows
escaping this inherent limitation of integrality gaps. In this model, algorithms access the input
game only through a relaxed solution to the natural SoS relaxation for computing equilibria.
They can then adaptively construct a list of candidate solutions and invoke a verification oracle
to check if any candidate on the list is a solution. This model captures most well-studied
approximation algorithms such as those for Max-Cut, Sparsest Cut and Unique-Games.
The state-of-the-art algorithms for computing exact and approximate [LMM03] equilibria in
two-player, n-strategy games are captured in this model and require that at least one of i) size
(≈ running time) of the SoS relaxation or ii) the size of the list of candidates, be at least 2Ω(n) and
nΩ(log (n)) respectively. Our main result shows a lower bound that matches these upper bound
up to constant factors in the exponent.
This can be interpreted as an unconditional confirmation, in our restricted algorithmic
framework, of Rubinstein’s recent conditional hardness [Rub16] for computing approximate
equilibria.
Our proof strategy involves constructing a family of games that all share a common sum-
of-squares solution but every (approximate) equilibrium of one game is far from every (ap-
proximate) equilibrium of any other game in the family. Along the way, we strengthen the
unconditional lower bound against enumerative algorithms for finding approximate equilibria
due to Daskalakis-Papadimitriou [DP09] and the classical hardness result for finding equilibria
maximizing welfare due to Gilboa-Zemel [GZ89].
∗PrincetonUniversity/IAS, Princeton. Supported by aSchmidt FoundationFellowship andNSFGrant #CCF-1412958
†UIUC, Urbana-Champaign.
1 Introduction
How hard is it to compute equilibria in two player finite games?
This foundational question has been a driving force of research in algorithmic game theory for
almost three decades. Beginningwith the formalization of the complexity class PPAD, a systematic
investigation [Pap94, AKV05, SvS06, DP09, DGP09, CDT09] of this question eventually led to the
elegant result [DGP09, CDT09] establishing that computing equilibria (NE) in two-player games is
PPAD-complete.
Algorithmic progress has thus relied onmaking additional assumptions on the structure of the
games or relaxing the notion of equilibria [DP09, LMM03, AKV05, KT10, Bar15, TS07, AGMS11,
BR17]. Perhaps the biggest success in this direction has been the celebrated quasi-polynomial time
approximate scheme of Lipton, Markakis and Mehta [LMM03] for approximate NE. In a major
recent breakthrough, Rubinstein [Rub16] showed that we cannot obtain any significant asymptotic
improvement over this algorithm assuming a strong, new conjecture: solving the PPAD-complete
“End-of-the-line” problem requires exponential time.
We thus obtain a fairly complete picture of complexity of NE in general games if we believe
strong enough fine-grained conjectures about the complexity of PPAD. This work is focused on the
central goal of obtaining reliable, independent evidence (given that a resolution currently appears
out of reach!) for such fine-grained complexity assumptions.
UnconditionalHardness forNE?. Astandard approach for investigating such questions attempts
to build a conditional theory of hardness based on (more believable) conjectures. This approach
has the attractive feature of understanding the limitations of any algorithm for computing NE.
However, since it is known that NE cannot be NP-hard unless NP  co-NP [MP91], such a plan
encounters serious obstacles.
The other influential approach builds unconditional hardness results for strong but restricted
class of relevant algorithmic techniques. Such results have largely focused on algorithmic tech-
niques based on systematic hierarchies of linear/semi-definite programs (LP/SDP), such as Sherali-
Adams, Lovász-Schrjiver and Sum-of-Squares. The focus of this work is investigating the sum-of-
squares SDP hierarchy for computing NE.
The sum-of-squares SDP hierarchy generalizes spectral methods and linear programming and
is formally the strongest known hierarchy of general, convex-programming based algorithmic
schemes. It captures the state-of-the-art algorithms for many fundamental algorithmic prob-
lems [ABS15, BRS11, GS11, ARV09] including the celebrated QPTAS for computing approximate
equilibria in game [HNW16], breaks many known hard instances of basic problems in combina-
torial optimization [BBH+12, OZ12], and has been remarkably successful in algorithm design for
both worst-case and average case problems [BKS17, BKS14, MSS16, BKS15, BM16, KS18b, KS18a,
BBKK18, HL18, KKM18].
Given the power of the technique, lower bounds against it can be credible indicators of com-
putational hardness and have been successfully used as such especially in areas where standard
conditional hardness results are infeasible. For example, some of the strongest known evidence
of hardness of many fundamental average-case problems such as Planted Clique, Refuting Random
Constraint SatisfactionProblems andMaximizingRandomPolynomials (or, “TensorPrincipalCom-
ponent Analysis”) comes from strong lower bounds [BHK+16, AOW15, KMOW17, RRS16, HSS15]
against the sum of squares algorithm.
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However, a priori, this approach also suffers from a similar foundational problem as the first
one. Lower bounds for convex relaxations are usually formalized as integrality gaps. Integrality
gaps show impossibility of approximating a certain objective function on the underlying solution
space with the given convex relaxation. However, NE is a search problemwithout any pre-defined
objective function. Restricting to the natural decision version trivializes the problem as every two
player finite game has an equilibrium. Thus, integrality gaps do not provide means of establishing
hardness for the problem.
Prior works [CS08, HK11, BKW15, DFS16] dealt with this issue by forcing some natural objec-
tive function on the space of equilibria and establishing the hardness of finding an equilibrium
that optimizes the chosen objective. For appropriate choices of such objectives, finding (or even
approximating) the best equilibria is known to be NP-hard [GZ89, CS08]. However, such a re-
sult doesn’t allow distinguishing whether the hardness is of finding any equilibrium or one that
optimizes the chosen objective function.
The main contribution of this work is a new approach to circumvent such issues and establish
unconditional hardness for finding any equilibrium using the sum-of-squares method by relying
on rounding gaps instead of integrality gaps.
Hardness via Rounding Gaps. The conceptual idea underlying our framework is quite simple.
A convex relaxation, such as the SoS SDP, returns a certain relaxed solution for the problem of
our interest. A relaxed solution will not generally be an actual solution so we thus must use an
additional, second step, usually known as rounding, that transforms a relaxed solution into an
actual equilibrium. Given that any algorithm for NE based on such a convex relaxation must
go through the additional rounding step, we will show hardness results for both the steps above
combined.
There’s an important issue, however. At the outset, the rounding algorithm might just ignore
the convex relaxation’s solution and just find an equilibrium for the underlying game from scratch.
Without settling the complexity of PPAD, thus, we cannot hope to prove a lower bound against
such “rounding” algorithms. Thus, we must restrict our rounding to procedures that really “use”
the solution to the convex relaxation and do not “cheat” by ignoring it.
Oblivious Rounding and Verification Oracles. An oblivious rounding algorithm takes input the
relaxed solution (generated by the convex relaxation) and outputs a true solution with the crucial
restriction that the output be a function of only the relaxed solution. In particular for us, an
oblivious rounding algorithm for computing NE accesses the underlying payoff matrices of the
input game only indirectly via the solution to the SoS SDP.
This class of roundings was first formalized in a work of Feige, Feldman and Talgam-
Cohen [FFT16] in the context of certain mechanism design problems (see a longer discussion
in Section 2.3). While such rounding algorithms might appear restrictive at the outset, a simple
inspection reveals that, in hindsight, some of the most powerful SDP rounding algorithms in
the literature are in fact oblivious! This includes, for instance, the famous algorithms for Max-
Cut [GW01], Sparsest Cut [ARV09] and unique games/small-set-expansion [BRS11]. Finally, a
recent work of Harrow-Natarajan and Wu [HNW16] shows that the guarantees of the Lipton-
Markakis-Mehta [LMM03] algorithm for computing approximate equilibria can be matched by an
oblivious rounding based algorithm.
While oblivious rounding captures many famous rounding algorithms, there are a few notable
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exceptions that do not fit into this framework. This includes, for e.g., the rounding method for
arbitrary Constraint Satisfaction Problems [RS09] and the recentworks onpolynomial optimization
and its variants [BKS14]. Such works construct a list of candidate solutions based on the solution
to the relaxation and show that one of the candidates must in fact be a true solution. Indeed, such
an idea in particular captures the spectacularly successful “enumerative techniques” in computing
equilibria for various classes of games: cleverly construct a small search space that contains a
solution and thenbrute-force searchover it to find the solution,e.g., [LMM03,KT10,DP09,ALSV13].
Perhaps the most famous example of the usage of this idea is in fact the algorithm in [LMM03]
discussed above.
We thus allow our model to (possibly adaptively) generate a list of candidates and check if
one of them is a solution. This gives us the final class of roundings we work with in this paper:
Oblivious Roundings with Verification Oracle (OV). We measure the cost of the rounding in two
parameters: the running time of the relaxation and the number of candidate solutions generated.
Notably, we do not restrict the running time of the algorithm that constructs such a list from the
solution to the relaxation - in that sense, our model is information theoretic. We also allow certain
strengthening of the verification oracle but defer the details to the next section.
The resulting model is a strict strengthening of the oblivious algorithms framework used by
Daskalakis-Papadimitriou [DP09] to show optimality of the QPTAS for approximate equilibria
(longer discussion in Section 2.3). Our lower bounds thus immediately strengthen theirs.
Finally, we must note that our algorithmic model is strictly weaker than integrality gaps for
situationswhere theymake sense. This is because by construction, they can never capture the class
of all rounding algorithms for a given convex relaxation. More practically, there are important
rounding schemes that are not captured in our framework - for e.g., iterative rounding techniques
such as those used for the facility location problem [Li13]. At present, we do not know a clean
extension of our framework that can capture such rounding methods.
Known Algorithms. It is not hard to show that 2O(n) queries to the verification oracle (and “0”
convex relaxation cost) can find exact equilibria. TheQPTASof [LMM03] implies an algorithmwith
nO(log (n)) queries to find constant approximate equilibria (and “0” convex relaxation cost). Finally,
Harrow-Natarajan-Wu [HNW16] show that the same result can be obtained via an algorithm with
nO(log (n))-convex relaxation cost and “0” queries to the verification oracle.
We are now ready to summarize our main hardness results for computing equilibria in this
framework.
Summary of Results. Our main results establish that the known algorithms for computing equi-
libria, both exact and approximate, are optimal, up to polynomial factors in ourmodel. Specifically,
we show that for two-player games with n strategies and all payoffs in [−1, 1],
1. for any ε 6 Θ(1/n4), there’s no algorithm that uses a 2o(n)-time SoS relaxation to construct a
2o(n)-size list of candidates to compute an ε-approximate NE.
2. for some constant ε > 0, there’s no algorithm that uses a no(log (n))-time SoS relaxation to
construct a list of size no(log (n)) to compute an ε-approximate equilibrium.
Our results can be seen as unconditional confirmation, in our restricted algorithmic framework, of
the recent result of Rubinstein [Rub16].
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Since ours is a stronger model of computation, our lower-bounds strictly improve upon those
of Daskalakis-Papadimitriou [DP09]. Along the way, we also strengthen the lower bound in their
more restricted model (see Section 2.2). We also obtain a “gapped” (approximation hardness)
version improving on the classical result of Gilboa-Zemel [GZ89] (see Section 2.2).
We give a brief outline of what follows next before the technical sections. In Section 2, we
present a formal description of our algorithmic model and state precise versions of our results. We
also discuss some of the improvements to previouswork that we obtain along theway. In Section 3,
we give an overview of the main technical ideas required in our proofs. Finally, in Section 2.3, we
briefly discuss important related work.
2 Algorithmic Model and Statements of Results
We first set up the standard terminology for talking about games and equilibria.
A game G betweenAlice and Bobwith n strategies for both is described by two payoffmatrices
R and C in [−1, 1]n×n ,1 where Alice plays rows and Bob plays columns. A mixed-strategy (now
on called strategy) for either of the players is an element of ∆n  {x ∈ [0, 1]n |
∑n
i1 xi  1} and
encodes a probability distribution on the space of n pure strategies {1, . . . , n} denoted by [n] now
on.
We write e i ∈ ∆n , for the i th pure strategy. When Alice plays x ∈ ∆n and Bob y ∈ ∆n , the
expected payoffs for the two players are x⊤Ry and x⊤C y, respectively.
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy pair (x , y) such that no player gains by deviating
unilaterally. That is,
x
⊤Ry > e⊤i Ry for all i ∈ [n]; x⊤C y > x⊤Ce j for all j ∈ [n]. (2.1)
At an ε-approximate NE (ε-NE) no player gains by more than ε by deviating unilaterally:
x
⊤Ry > e⊤i Ry − ε for all i ∈ [n]; x⊤C y > x⊤Ce j − ε for all j ∈ [n]. (2.2)
Sum-of-Squares Method and Pseudo-equilibria. The sum-of-squares method is a sequence of
increasingly tight SDP relaxations, indexed by an integer parameter d, for the problem of finding
a solution to a system of polynomial inequalities in real valued variables. We provide a brief
overview of this method specialized to computing (exact/approximate) equilibria here and point
the reader to the lecture notes [BS] for further details on method and its applications.
Central to the sum of squares method is the notion of a pseudo-distribution that generalizes
probability distributions.
Definition 2.1 (Pseudo-distribution). Adegree d pseudo-distribution is a finitely supportedsigned
measure µ˜ on n such that the associated linear functional (pseudo-expectation) ˜ that maps any
function f : n →  to ˜[ f ]  ∑x:µ˜(x),0 µ˜(x) f (x) satisfies the following properties:
1. Normalization: ˜[1]  1 or equivalently, ∑x:µ˜(x),0 µ˜(x)  1, and
2. Positivity: ˜[q2] > 0 for every degree 6 d/2 polynomial q on n .
1Adding dummy strategies tomake the number of strategies equal, and normalizing payoffs to lie in [−1, 1] iswithout
loss of generality.
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A pseudo-distribution µ˜ is said to satisfy a polynomial inequality constraint q > 0 if for every
polynomial p, ˜[p2q] > 0 whenever deg(p2q) 6 d.
It’s not hard to show that any degree∞ pseudo-distribution is a probability distribution onn .
Since ˜µ˜ is a linear operator, it is completely specified by its action on any basis of Pd . The
monomial xS  Πi x
Si
i
for any S ∈ n , ∑ni1 Si 6 d (the total degree) form a basis for Pd . Let
(1, x) ∈ n+1 denote the vector with first coordinate 1 and last n coordinates matching x ∈ n .
Then, the order-d tensor ˜µ˜[(1, x)⊗d]has entries equal to pseudo-moments of µ˜and thus completely
describes the pseudo-expectation ˜µ˜ .
When µ˜ is a probability measure on n , the associated pseudo-expectation is an actual expec-
tation operator. Key to the utility of the notion of pseudo-distributions is the following classical
fact.
Fact 2.2 (Lasserre, Shor, Parillo, Nesterov [Las01, NWY00, Par00, Sho89]). Let
11, 12, . . . , 1r , h1, h2, . . . , hq be polynomials of degree at most d. Then, the convex set
d  {˜
µ˜
[(1, x)⊗d] | µ˜: deg d, satisfies 11  0, 12  0, . . . , 1r  0, h1 > 0, h2 > 0, . . . , hs > 0}
has an nO(d)-time weak separation oracle in the sense of [GLS81].
Definition 2.3 (Sum-of-Squares Algorithm). The degree d sum-of-squares algorithm takes input
a system of polynomial constraints 11  0, 12  0, . . . , 1r  0, h1 > 0, h2 > 0, . . . , hs > 0 each of
degree at most d and either outputs “infeasible” or returns a degree d pseudo-expectation ˜µ˜
satisfying Definition 2.4. Fact 2.2 implies that the degree d SoS algorithm runs in time nO(d).
Pseudo-distributions naturally suggest a relaxation of the notion of equilibrium, which we
call, pseudo-equilibrium. The advantage is that unlike equilibria, pseudo-equilibria of degree d are
efficiently computable using Fact 2.2. It might be helpful to note that degree 2 pseudo-equilibria
(without the semi-definite constraints) correspond to thewell-studied notion of correlated equilibria.
Definition 2.4 (Degree d Pseudo-equilibrium). Given a two player game (R, C), a degree d pseudo-
equilibrium for (R, C) is a degree d pseudo-distribution on strategy profiles (x , y) satisfying
the quadratic polynomial inequality constraints in (2.1). A degree d, ε-approximate pseudo-
equilibrium is a degree d pseudo-distribution over strategy profiles (x , y) satisfying the quadratic
polynomial constraints in (2.2).
2.1 Rounding Framework for Equilibria
In this section, we present our algorithmic framework based on restricted roundings of sum-
of-squares relaxations. While the framework naturally generalizes to any polynomial feasibility
problems, we will focus only on (exact) NE here.
Let Ψ(G) be the system of polynomial inequalities in x , y ∈ n parameterized by a game G
represented by R, C ∈ n×n described in (2.1).
A rounding algorithm takes a solution to the SoS relaxation forΨ(G) and outputs a candidate
equilibrium strategy profile (x∗ , y∗). Before presenting our restricted rounding framework, we
formally define what we mean by a rounding algorithm.
Definition 2.5 (RoundingAlgorithm). Adegree d rounding algorithm forΨ(G) takes input a game
G and a degree d pseudo-expectation satisfying the NE constraints of G and outputs a solution to
Ψ(G).
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Remark 2.6. As discussed, this definition captures all algorithms as one could simply ignore the
degree d pseudo-expectation. Notice that we place no restriction on the running time of the
rounding algorithm at all.
Next, we present a meaningful restriction of arbitrary roundings that forces the algorithm to
“use” the solution to the relaxation. We do this by simply disallowing the access to the game G
itself.
Definition 2.7 (Oblivious Rounding). A degree d oblivious rounding algorithm is a rounding
algorithm that does not get access to the instance (i.e., game) G itself. The cost of an oblivious
rounding algorithm is the degree of the SoS solution it accesses.
Remark 2.8. Two comments are in order:
1. Observe that we do not restrict the running time of an oblivious algorithm. In that respect,
this model and the resulting lower bounds are information theoretic.
2. This definitionwas first proposed in [FFT16] for optimization problems (ours is a “feasibility”
problem as it has no objective) who gave a characterization of problems where oblivious
rounding algorithms achieved the underlying integrality gap.
While this may appear like a restricted framework, it nonetheless captures several famous algo-
rithms obtained via convex relaxation + rounding paradigm such as those for Max-Cut, Sparsest-
Cut, Unique Games etc.
To allow our rounding algorithm more power and capture a longer list of existing algorithms,
we allow the oblivious rounding algorithm generate a list of candidate solutions instead of a single
one and then check if one of them is indeed a solution using access to a verification oracle. This
allows us to (i) capture most known rounding algorithms mentioned above with the exception of
techniques such as iterative rounding (i i) provide our model the ability to simulate “enumeration”
over a restricted search space - a widely used technique in computing equilibria for various classes
of games.
To formalize this model, we will allow the algorithm to access the game through a verification
oracle in addition to a degree d pseudo-equilibrium.
Definition 2.9 (Verification Oracle). A verification oracle for an instance (i.e., game) G takes input
a candidate solution (i.e., a strategy profile (x , y)) and correctly outputs “accept” if the candidate
is a true solution (i.e, an equilibrium) and “reject” otherwise.
We can now augment the oblivious rounding algorithms with a verification oracle access to
the underlying instance (game) G.
Definition 2.10 (Oblivious Rounding with Verification Oracle OV). A degree d, q-query oblivious
rounding algorithm with verification oracle is a degree d oblivious rounding algorithm that, in
addition, accessed a verification oracle for the underlying instance G at most q times.
Remark 2.11. Three comments are in order, again.
1. As in the case of oblivious rounding algorithms, note that we do not restrict/measure the
running time of the algorithm.
2. Observe that the model allows “adaptivity” - the candidate solutions can be generated after
looking at the replies of the verification oracle for previous candidates.
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3. This model strictly strengthens the “Oblivious algorithms" model studied in [DP09]. Obliv-
ious algorithms, in the sense of [DP09] are simply degree 0 OV algorithms. That is, OV
algorithms that get access only to the verification oracle and neither the game nor the pseudo-
equilibrium.
Finally, for the special case of equilibria, we can allow an even stronger access to the underlying
game through a more powerful oracle. Observe that if we fix one of x or y in (2.1) and (2.2), then
the resulting system of constraints is linear in the other variables. Thus, one can check feasibility
of this resulting system in polynomial time.
Motivated by this, we can define an oracle that takes input a “partial strategy” - either one
of x or y - and check if there’s an equilibrium that agrees with the given partial strategy. This
definition, unlike all others, is not meaningful for arbitrary polynomial systemsΨ(G).
Definition 2.12 (Partial Verification Oracle). A partial verification oracle for a game G takes input
one of x , y and outputs “accept” if there’s an equilibrium for G that agrees with the input and
“reject” otherwise.
Remark 2.13. It is important to observe that a partial verification oracle is a stronger access to the
underlying game - namely, it allows checking if there’s an equilibrium matching only one of the
player’s strategies. Indeed, as we will note in the discussion of our results, the lower bound of
Daskalakis-Papadimitriou does not hold for algorithms that have this stronger access to game via
a Partial verification oracle.
As a by product of our proof, we obtain a strengthening of their result that holds against
oblivious algorithms that get access to the stronger partial verification oracle.
2.2 Our Results
Our main results are optimal lower bounds for OV roundings of Sum-of-Squares for computing
exact and approximate equilibria. Throughout this section, we refer to a two-player game with n
strategies each and all payoffs bounded in [−1, 1] by just a “game”.
Our result for computing exact equilibria is actually robust and allows a certain small but
non-trivial relaxation of the notion of equilibria. More precisely, we show that:
Theorem 2.14 (Exponential Lower Bound for NE). Suppose there is degree d, q query OV rounding for
finding ε  Θ(1/n4)-approximate equilibria in games. Then, either d  Ω(n) or q  2Ω(n). Further, the
same results holds for OV algorithms with the stronger partial verification oracle.
This follows from a construction of a family of games with properties captured in the following
theorem:
Theorem 2.15 (Exponentially large hard family). For every n large enough, there’s a family of Γ  2Θ(n)
games {Gi  (Ai , Bi)}Γi1 with n pure strategies for both players and all payoffs in [−1, 1] such that:
(1.) Completeness: There exists a degree Θ(n), shared pseudo-equilibrium for every Gi simultaneously.
(2.) Soundness: For any i , j if (x , y) and (x′, y′) are Ω(1/n4)-NE of games Gi and G j respectively then
x , x′ and y , y′.
To see why this implies Theorem 2.14, choose an input game G uniformly at random from the
family described by the Theorem2.15. Then, any (potentially randomized) algorithm that succeeds
with 2/3 probabilty in computing an ε-NE in G requires either d  Ω(n) or q  2Ω(n).This is because,
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using property (2) above, such an algorithm must uniquely and correctly identify the input game
with probability at least 2/3. The SoS relaxation can just output the shared pseudo-equilibrium
giving zero information about the input game. Further, each “reject” answer from the (partial)
verification oracle rules out exactly one possibility. Thus, the OV algorithm must use 2Ω(n) queries.
In establishing this result, we prove a “gapped” version of the classical hardness reduction of
Gilboa-Zemel from k-clique to finding well-supported equilibria with payoff at leaset δ > 0. While
in a Nash equilibrium, each player’s strategy must put a non-zero probability only on the pure
strategies with maximum payoffs, in an ε-well-supported NE, the support of any player’s strategy
can contain pure strategies that have an ε additively smaller payoff compared to the maximum
(see Section 3 for a formal definition). Well-supported equilibria are a weaker solution concept
than equilibria and thus, this is technically stronger than one that shows a gapped hardness for
finding NE.
Theorem 2.16. There’s a polynomial time reduction that takes input a graph H on n vertices and parameters
k 6 n , ε  Ω(1/n2) and produces a two-player game G with O(n) strategies for each player with all payoffs
in [−1, 1] such that (i) if H has a k-clique there exists a NE for G with payoff δ > 0, and (i i) if H has no
k-Clique then all ε-well-supported NE of G have payoffs at most (δ − ε).
Our second main result is a quasi-polynomial lower bound on OV algorithms for finding
constant-approximate equilibria.
Theorem 2.17. Suppose there exists a degree d, q-query algorithm for computing ε-approximate equilibria
in games for some small enough ε  Θ(1). Then, either d  Ω(log (n)) or q  nΩ(log (n). Further, the same
result continues to hold for OV algorithms that use the stronger partial verification oracle.
As above, we obtain this theorem by giving a construction of a hard family of games:
Theorem 2.18 (Quasi-polynomial Hardness for O(1)-NE). For every n large enough, there’s a family
of Γ  nΩ(log (n)) two-player games {Gi  (Ri , Ci)}Γi1 with n strategies and all payoffs in [−1, 1] s.t.:
(1.) Completeness: All Gi’s share a common degree Θ(log (n)) pseudo-equilibrium.
(2.) Soundness: There exists an ε  O(1), such that for any i , j and any pair of ε-NE in Gi and G j, say
(x , y) and (x′, y′) respectively, x , x′ and y , y′.
Along the way to this result, we extend the result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou on lower
bounds for their model of oblivious algorithms. Their construction, in the language of this paper,
shows lower bounds on the number of calls to the Verification Oracle 2.9 described before [DP09].
We extend it to lower bound against the stronger Oracle 2.12.
Corollary 2.19. For a given game (R, C)with n strategies, if an algorithm queries Oracle 2.12 q times and
outputs an O(1)-NE of (R, C), then q  nΩ(log (n)).
Remark 2.20 (Well-Supported NE vs NE). Three points in order.
1. The notion of approximate well-supported NE has been of independent interest and studied
as such (see for e.g. [CDT09, DP09]). Since every ε-WNE of a game is also its ε-NE, all our
lower bounds hold for finding WNE as well.
2. Our proofs, in fact, yield a stronger hardness result for finding ε-WNE : we show that finding
ε  O(1/n2)-WNE requires an exponential degree or queries to the (partial) verification
oracle.
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3. One can strengthen our results to an oracle that gets another strong access to the underlying
game: given the support of both player’s strategies, accept if there’s an equilibrium with
those supports. Our lower bounds work against such verification oracles too.
2.3 Related Work
We discuss three works that are especially relevant to this work.
The sum-of-squares SDP hierarchy was recently studied in the context of computing equilibria
by Harrow-Natarajan-Wu [HNW16]. In the language of the present paper, they showed that (i)
there’s a quasi-polynomial degree oblivious rounding (that does not need access to the verification
oracle) that matches the guarantees of the algorithm in [LMM03] and (i i) there’s a cost2measure on
equilibria such that thedegreeΩ(log (n)) sum-of-squares algorithmhas a constant-factor integrality
gap in approximating it over the space of all constant approximate equilibria. While both theworks
show a hardness for the sum-of-squares algorithm for computing equilibria, in contrast to their
work that focuses on showing an integrality gap for a certain objective measure over equilibria, we
focus on the task of computing any equilibrium.
The notion of oblivious roundings was first studied in a work due to Feige, Feldman and
Talgam-Cohen [FFT16]. Their work gave a neat characterization of the problems where oblivious
roundings can achieve the integrality gap (for optimization, instead of feasibility problems that
we study in this work) of the underlying relaxation. Their main application was for the maximum
welfare problem where they showed that if the valuation functions of the agents are submodular,
then, oblivious rounding achieves the integrality gap of the natural configuration LP relaxation for
the problem, while, for the case of gross substitute valuations, oblivious roundings cannot achieve
the integrality gap of the configuration LP for the problem.
Thework ofDaskalakis-Papadimitriou [DP09] studied algorithms that obliviously (= degree 0OV
algorithms using the standard verification oracle 2.9) search the smallest possible space of strategy
profiles to find an approximate equilibrium. Their main motivation was showing that among
all oblivious algorithms, the Lipton-Markakis-Mehta algorithm is almost optimal for computing
approximate equilibria in games. Their lower bounds, however do not apply to algorithms that
use the stronger partial verification oracle 2.12.
While this can appear somewhat technical, this difference comes from a fairly intuitive differ-
ence between our two constructions. The construction of [DP09] gives a collection of ≈ nlog (n)
games such that every approximate equilibrium of any single game is different from every approx-
imate equilibrium of any other. However, each game admits an approximate equilibria that agree
on the strategy of one of the players. While this is enough to fool the standard verification oracle
(=oblivious algorithms), it does not suffice to fool the stronger partial verification oracle.
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3 Technical Overview
Our main results establish lower bounds that match the existing upper bounds for OV algo-
rithms with the stronge partial verification oracle for computing Θ(1/n4) (robust, exact) and Θ(1)-
approximate Nash equilibrium computation.
Both our constructions will follow via three modular steps.
1. Construct a family of games that are hard for degree 0 OV algorithms - i.e., algorithms
that rely only on the (partial) verification oracle. This will strengthen the result in [DP09]
for constant-approximate equilibria and provide a new construction for the case of (exact)
1/pol y(n)-approximate equilibria.
2. Construct a game such that approximating the equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare
(sum of the payoffs) of the two players (social welfare) is hard for degree d SoS algorithm. It is
important to stress this point: even though our final aim is to construct a lower bound for the
feasibility problem, the SoS hardness is for the optimization version, namely, for maximizing
the social welfare. As discussed in the related work, the proof in [HNW16] does not give
such a result at the moment. However, there are hardness results in the optimization setting
(we rely on the recent work in [DFS16]) based on standard conjectures such as P , NP or
Exponential Time Hypothesis in this setting which we leverage in our construction.
3. A black-box result that allows “stitching” together the two kinds of hard games into a single
family of games that are hard for OV algorithms. The technical heart of the proof here is
establishing that the process of “stitching” together the two kinds of hard games does not
introduce new spurious (approximate) equilibria that destroy the first or the second property
above.
This overview is organized as follows. First, we describe the ideas in our “stitching” theorem
as it applies to both our lower-bound results. This part holds in a fairly general setting. Second,
we describe the ideas in the construction of the two kinds of games above to complete the proofs
of our two lower bound results.
3.1 Stitching Hard Games Together
Before proceeding, we need to define the notion of well-supported equilibria: a well-studied
relaxation of the notion of equilibria [CDT09, DP09] that we briefly discussed in Section 2.2.
For integer n and any T ⊆ [n], let Un ,T be probability vector of a distribution on [n] that is
uniform over T.
Definition 3.1 (Well-Supported Equilibria). A strategy profile (x , y) of game with payoff matrices
(R, C) is called an ε-approximate well-supported NE (in short, ε-WNE ) iff every pure strategy
in the support of x has a payoff within ε of the maximum given the column player plays y and
vice-versa. That is,
for every i ∈ [n], x i > 0⇒ e⊤i Ry > max
k∈[n]
e⊤k Ry−ε and y i > 0⇒ x⊤Cei > max
k∈[n]
x
⊤Cek−ε. (3.1)
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Remark 3.2. Observe that anyNE is an ε-WNE . And every ε-WNE is an ε-approximateNE. However,
an ε-approximate NE, in general, is not an ε-WNE .
Next, we formalize the two kinds of hard games that we discussed in the previous subsection.
Our requirement from the SoSHard game is straightforward. Wewant a gamewhere the social
welfare of a pseudo-equilibrium is higher than the social welfare of every ε-WNE by at least 2ε.
Definition 3.3 (degree t, (ε, δ)-SoSHard game). For some ε < δ, a game (R, C) is said to be
degree t, (ε, δ)-SoSHard game if there’s a degree t pseudo-equilibriumwith payoffs for each player
exceeding δ > 0 while the social welfare (sum of the payoffs of the players) in every ε-WNE is at
most 2(δ − ε).
Our requirement from the hard family of games for oblivious algorithms, i.e., enumerative
techniques, denoted by EnumHard games, is the following. We want a family of games with K
strategies each, that is indexed by a low-intersection family of subsets of [K] such that all ε-WNE
of a game indexed by S are close to the uniform distribution on the strategies in S ⊆ [K].
Definition 3.4 ( (ε, τ)-EnumHard game). For some β > 0, F be a family of subsets of [K] so that
for any pair S, T ∈ F , |S∆T | > βτεK, or, equivalently, ‖UK,S − UK,T ‖1 > βτε. A family of games
(RS , CS) with K strategies each, indexed by subsets S ∈ F is said to be (ε, τ)-EnumHard if any
ε-WNE (x , y) of (RS , CS) satisfies: ‖x −UK,S‖1 , ‖y −UK,S‖1 6 τ.
The SoSHard game above gives degree t SoS hardness of obtaining high payoff ε-WNE (and
thus, also for finding NE). Similarly, for β > 2, the family of EnumHard games constructed for each
S ∈ F would give lower bound of q(β)-queries to the verification oracle to find ε-WNE . Observe,
however, that neither hardness hold for the notion of eqiulibria we care about: ε-approximate NE.
Our goal now is to combine the above to constructions to obtain a family of games for computing
ε-approximate NE via OV algorithms with appropriate degree and number of queries. The major
issue in combining two games is to handle equilibria that are supported on startegies of both the
games. The goal of our construction is to avoid these.
Construction of the Hard Family. Let (R, C) be N ×N game and (RS , CS) be K ×K game with all
payoffs in [−1, 1]. We will use these two constructions to obtain a family of games (R′
S
, C′
S
) with
(N + K) pure strategies for each player and show :
1. SoS Completeness: any pseudo-equilibrium for the SoSHard game with payoff at least δ
for each player is a pseudo-equilibrium for every (R′
S
, C′
S
), and
2. Soundness: every ε-NE of (R′
S
, C′
S
) is close, in L1 distance, toUS.
We first describe the construction. Throughout this overview, it will be easier for the sake
of exposition to allow payoffs in our games to exceed 1 in magnitude - we finally just have to
normalize the game to bring all payoffs in [−1, 1].
For every S ∈ F , the family of sets F indexing the EnumHard family of games, we construct a
new game (R′
S
, C′
S
) as follows (where δ and −2 denote blocks of appropriate sizes with all entries
equal to δ and −2 respectively).
R′S 
[
R −2
δ RS
]
and C′S 
[
C δ
−2 CS
]
(3.2)
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Completeness. The proof of completeness (Lemma 4.4) is intuitively based on the following ele-
mentary observation. Suppose (R, S)had an equilibrium (x , y)with payoff at least δ for each player.
Then, we note that (x , y) is also an equilibrium in the new game (R′
S
, C′
S
). This is simply because
the row (respectively, column) player has no incentive to use strategies in the lower (respectively,
right) block. Of course, (R, S) does not have such an equilibrium, only a pseudo-equilibrium, but
it turns out that the same argument as above extends to pseudo-equilibria.
Soundness. The proof of soundness requires a lengthier argument. The proof is based on two
intermediate claims: (i) every ε-WNE of (R′
S
, C′
S
) is supported only on last K strategies for both the
players (Lemma 4.5) and (i i) every ε-NE of (R′
S
, C′
S
) is close (in L1 distance) to an ε-WNE . It is not
hard to show soundness using these two claims, that is, that each ε-NE of the game is close to (in L1
distance) (0N ,UK,S) (Lemma 4.7). From the first claim, we can conclude that every ε-WNE of game
(R′
S
, C′
S
) is essentially an ε-WNE of game (RS , CS). By the second claim and triangle inequality
for L1 distance, τε close to UK,S. The proof of the second claim above follows from essentially a
straightforward calculation and incurs a factor τ loss in the distance and a quadratic loss in the
approximation.
To prove the first claim, we first note the following “dichotomy” in the game: either both players
play some of first N pure strategies or neither does. This is immediate because of the presence of
off-diagonal block with all payoffs (−2) in the two payoff matrices. Next, we observe that if the
players’ strategy is supported on some of the first N pure strategies, then, in fact, the probability
mass on the first N strategies should be Θ(1) for each. This is again a direct consequence of the
presence of the (−2) off-diagnal block in the payoff matrices.
Next, we observe that if we take any ε-WNE of (R′
S
, C′
S
) and condition on using only the first N
strategies, then the resulting strategy pair should be an ε-WNE for (R, C). This is because for any
i ∈ [N], the payoff from playing i given that the second player plays any strategy in the second
block is equal and (−2). By the soundness property of SoSHard game, the total payoff from this
first N × N block of the game, thus, can be at most 2(δ −O(ε)). On the other hand, for any strategy
in the first N×N block, each of the last K strategies for the other player give a payoff of at least δ for
both players. Thus, there’s an incentive for at least one of the players to deviate to playing one of
the K strategies. Using the “dichotomy” claim above, the other player must also deviate similarly.
These arguments ultimately yield the following “stiching-together” result:
Theorem 3.5. Given parameters ε, δ > ε, and τ > 0, (i) let (R, C) be a degree t, (ε, δ)-SoSHard game of
dimension N × N , and (i i) for an integer K, appropriately chosen β, and subsets S1, . . . , Sq(β) of [K] such
that | |UK,Si −UK,S j | |1 > βτε, let (RSi , CSi) be an (ε, τ)-EnumHard game for each i ∈ {1, . . . , q(β)}.
Then, for the family of gamesF  {Gi | Gi is the game of (3.2) constructed using (R, C) and (RSi , CSi)},
(1.) All Gi’s have a common degree t pseudo-equilibrium.
(2.) For any pair of games Gi , Gj ∈ F , their O(ε2)-NE strategy sets of either players do not intersect.
The above theorem implies that if there exists degree d, q-query algorithm to find ε2-NE in two
player games, then d  Ω(t) and q  Ω(q(β)).
3.2 O(nlog(n)) lower bound for the constant approximation
Given the discussion in Section 3.1, we only need to give separate constructions of SoSHard games
with degree d  Θ(log(n)), and nΩ(log (n))-large family of EnumHard games for some constant ε > 0.
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Reduction from planted clique does not work, yet. The first candidate here, of course, is the
reduction of Hazan-Krauthgamer [HK11] who show such a reduction from the planted clique
problem in average case complexity. A recent work of Barak-Hopkins-Kelner-Kothari-Moitra-
Potechin [BHK+16] shows a quasi-polynomial SoS lower bound for the planted clique problem.
Thus, a priori, it appears that we immediately obtain the SoSHard game as required here.
There’s a subtle issue, however, that prevents this program fromgoing through. For a reduction
to carry over and give a SoS lower bound, we must show that the map that takes a solution to
the starting problem (i.e., planted clique) into a solution to the problem of interest (approximate
equilibria maximizing social welfare) be computed by a low-degree polynomial (see Fact 5.6).
Now, in the reduction due to Hazan-Krauthgamer, this map is really simple: start from the
planted clique, say S, and return uniform distribution on pure strategies corresponding to the
vertices in the clique, sayUS. If x is the indicator vector of the clique, then, the resulting equilibrium
is essentially described by x/|S |. This appears like a degree 1 map except for one important issue -
each non-zero entry of US is 1/|S |. If the size of the clique we planted is “fixed”, then, this entry
is a constant and the map is indeed a degree 1 polynomial. However, technically, fixing the size
of the clique requires that the SoS lower bound hold for the feasibility version of the polynomial
program for clique that has an explicit size-constraint for the clique.
Unfortunately, at present, the lower bound in [BHK+16] holds only for the optimization version
of the clique program that doesn’t have an explicit clique size constraint. While we fully expect the
SoS lower bound to hold for both versions of the clique program, at present there are significant
technical difficulties in extending the lower bound to the feasibility version.
Relying on known ETH hardness results. The starting point of our construction of the SoSHard
game is the recent work [DFS16] that shows a construction of a game (R, C) via reduction from free
repetitions of 3SAT (an idea that began in the work of [AIM14] and first used to show hardness of
computing equilibria in [BKW14]) to show hardnesss of maximizing social welfare in two-player
games modulo the ETH. Now, there are standard hardness results for approximating 3SAT via SoS
(i.e., Grigoriev’s Theorem). Thus, we will be done if we could show that the reduction appearing
in the ETH hardness holds also when restricted to SoS algorithm. Long story short, there’s a
simple sufficient condition to check in this regard (variant of which appeared first in the work
of Tulsiani [Tul09]) and demands only that the map that takes a solution of 3SAT into a solution
of the problem at hand be a low-degree polynomial. We give a brief overview of the reduction
(see Section 6.1 ) in [DFS16] and argue why their reduction induces a low-degree polynomial map
between solutions. Checking that the appropriate parameters hold gives us our SoSHard game as
required.
Such a result might be of independent interest so we state it here in a standalone form.
Lemma 3.6 (SoSHard game for O(1)-NE). There exists a game (R, C) for R, C ∈ [−1, 1]N×N such that:
1. Completeness: There’s a degree Ω(log (N)), pseudo-equilibrium with payoffs > 1 for both players.
2. Soundness: For every ε-NE (x , y) payoffs of both players is at most (1 − ε) for ε > 1/1200.
The starting point of our constructionofEnumHard game is thework of [DP09] discussedbefore,
which we briefly note the important aspects of it before proceeding.
Let m 
( l
l/2
)
for some even integer l and fix any ε > 0. The family of games (AS , BS) is indexed
by a collections of subsets S ⊆ [m], each of size ℓ. The key property of this family is that for every
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ε-WNE of (AS , BS), the support of the row player’s strategy is contained in S. Further, the row
player’s strategy is at most O(ε) L1 distance away from theUm ,S in the l1 norm. Finally, for a given
β > 0 there exists a family of at least n(0.8−2βε) log(m) many such subsets S, such that for any pair of
subsets S, S′, | |Um ,S −Um ,S′ | |1 > βε.
As noted before, this construction doesn’t give a lower bound against the partial verification
oracle as there’s an ε-WNE for every game that share the column player’s strategy. To construct an
EnumHard game, we need such guarantees for both the players.
It appears natural to somehow take an additional flipped copy of the gamewith the two players’
role reversed and combine them somehow to get EnumHard game. The challenge of course is to
combine them in such a way that ensures that all constant approximate equilibria are still close
to the appropriate uniform strategy. With a slightly technical argument, we show that there’s a
simple construction that satisfies such a requirement (see Section 6.2).
3.3 Exponential lower bound for the inverse-polynomial approximation
As before, we need to construct a degreeΩ(n) SoSHard game and an exponentially large family of
EnumHard games with disjoint set of O(1/n2)-WNE .
For a SoSHard game, as before, we can work with any reduction that (i) starts from a problem
that is hard for SoS and (i i) produces a game where approximating the payoff of the best 1/n2-
approximate WNE is hard.
Our idea for constructing the SoSHard game is again based on a reduction from a problemwith
known, exponential SoS lower bounds. Specifically, we give a reduction from the independent-set
problem to a gap version of approximate Nash equilibrium. Given a graph G  (V, E) on n vertices
and a parameter k, we construct a (2n + 1) × (2n + 1) game (R, C). We show that: (i) if G has a k
sized independent set then game (R, C) has an equilibrium with payoff (1 + 1/2k) (Lemma 5.4), (i i)
if G does not have an independent set of size k then all (1/5k)-WNE of game (R, C) gives payoff at
most 1 (Lemma 5.5).
Our construction is inspired by the classical work of Gilboa and Zemel [GZ89] (see (5.1)).
The completeness of this construction is easy. Given an independent set of G, it can be argued
that uniform distribution on the support of the independent set is in fact an equilibrium for the
game above. Further, the size of the independent set, k, is fixed as a parameter (equivalently,
appears as a constraint in the polynomial programwe consider). This implies that the equilibrium
is computed via adegree 1 (linear)map andwe can immediately apply the technology for importing
reductions into SoS framework (Fact 5.6). Combiningwith the knownSoS lower bounds for finding
independent sets of fixed k  Θ(n) size [Tul09] completes the proof.
To construct an EnumHard game, we use generalized matching pennies (GMP) game. Here the
row-player wants to match strategies with the column-player, while column-player does not want
to match, i.e., game (R, C) such that R(i , i)  1, C(i , i)  −1, and the rest are zero. It is easy to see
that the uniform distribution over all strategies is the only NE strategy for both the players. We
show that in an m × m game, even (1/m2)-WNE is at distance at most O(1/m) from the uniform
strategy in l1 norm (Lemma 5.8).
Now for every subset S ⊆ [n] we construct an n × n game (RS , CS), and embed m  |S | sized
GMP into its S×S block. Wemake sure that all strategies outside S are strictly dominated by those
inside S by a large margin in payoffs. Thus ε-WNE of game (RS , CS) are essentially ε-WNE of the
GMP game, and therefore they concentrate around uniform distribution on S, namelyUn ,S. This
gives an EnumHard game (Lemma 5.9). Finally, the property that | |Un ,S −Un ,S′ | |1 > 1n for any two
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distinct subsets S, S′ of [n], gives us the desired property that the ε-WNE sets of corresponding
EnumHard games (RS , CS) and (RS′ , CS′) do not intersect in either player’s strategy. This gives us a
family of 2Ω(n) many EnumHard games, corresponding to subsets of [n].
The above construction of degree Ω(n) SoSHard game, and a family of 2Ω(n) many EnumHard
games, together with Theorem 3.5 gives Theorem 5.1.
4 Stitching EnumHard and SoSHard games together
In this section, we showhow to combine hardness against SoS and hardness against "enumeration"
to obtain lower bounds against OV algorithms. For this we will first work with a stronger notion
of approximation, namely ε-well-supported NE (WNE ), described next.
4.1 Well-Supported NE vs. Approximate NE
Recall Definition 3.1 of ε-approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium. We state the condition
formally below for the reader: For a two player game (R, C), a strategy profile (x , y) is an ε-WNE
iff
for every i 6 n , xi > 0⇒ e⊤i Ry > max
k
e⊤k Ry − ε and yi > 0⇒ x⊤Cei > maxk x
⊤Cek − ε.
Strategies giving maximum payoff to a player are called her best response, and those giving at
least maximum minus ε payoff ε-best response, defined below:
BR1(y)  {i ∈ [n] | i ∈ argmaxk e⊤k Ry} and BR2(x)  {i ∈ [n] | i ∈ argmaxk x⊤Cei}
ε-BR1(y)  {i ∈ [n] | e⊤i Ry > maxk e⊤k Ry − ε} and ε-BR2(x)  {i ∈ [n] | x⊤Cei > maxk x⊤Cek − ε}
Note that by definition, (x , y) is an ε-WNE iff supp(x) ⊆ ε-BR1(y) and supp(y) ⊆ ε-BR2(x). The
next lemma characterizes NE, approximate NE, WNE , and relates them.
Lemma 4.1. For any two player game (R, C) with payoffs in [0, 1] the following holds.
1. Strategy profile (x , y) is an NE iff supp(x) ⊆ BR1(y) and supp(y) ⊆ BR2(x).
2. Every ε-WNE is ε-NE.
3. If (x , y) is an ε-NE then ∑i<√ε-BR1(y) xi 6 √ε and∑i<√ε-BR2(x) yi 6 √ε.
4. Given ε-NE (x , y) we can construct (3√ε)-WNE (x′, y′) such that supp(x′) ⊆ √ε-BR1(y) and
supp(y′) ⊆ √ε-BR2(x).
Proof. Proofs of first and second part follow by definition. The argument for the third and fourth
part described next are essentially from Lemma 2.2 of [CDT09] due to Chen, Deng, and Teng.
For the third part, let i∗ ∈ BR1(y). Then, for each i <
√
ε-BR1(y) we have e⊤i Ry < e⊤i∗ Ry −
√
ε.
Therefore, if
∑
i<
√
ε-BR1(y) xi >
√
ε, then row player’s payoff x⊤Ry < e⊤
i∗ Ry − ε, a contradiction.
Similarly for y.
For the fourth part, construct of (x′, y′) from (x , y) by removing the probability mass from
strategies outside
√
ε-BR1(y) and uniformly distribute them on strategies of
√
ε-BR1(y). Since
payoffs are in [0, 1], this will increase or decrease payoffs of any strategy at most by √ε. Therefore,
(x′, y′) is (3√ε)-WNE . And supp(x′) ⊆ √ε-BR1(y) and supp(y′) ⊆
√
ε-BR2(x). 
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4.2 Abstract Game Construction
Our construction of the hard games are based on combining construction of integrality gap against
Sum-of-Squares relaxations computing equilibria that maximize social welfare and games that
are hard for enumeration based algorithms. We abstract out the properties of these two kinds of
hard games in this section. Our hardness results in the next two sections will invoke the general
combining strategy from this section.
First, we define two player games such that maximizing social welfare is hard for SoS.
Definition 4.2 (Games Hard for SoS). A game (R, C) for R, C ∈ [−1, 1]N×N is said to be degree t,
(ε, δ)-SoSHard for ε, δ ∈ [0, 1] if:
1. Completeness: There’s a degree t pseudo-equilibrium for the game (R, C) that has payoffs
for both players at least δ.
2. Soundness: Every ε-WNE (x , y) of (R, C) has total payoff x⊤(R + C)y < 2(δ − ε).
Next we need a game to construct the family of games with disjoint set of equilibria, and the
property we need from these is as follows.
Definition 4.3 (Games Hard for Enumeration). A K×K game (RS , CS), where S ⊆ [K], is said to be
(ε, τ, c)-EnumHard for τ > 0 and ε, c ∈ [0, 1] such that cK is an integer, if RS , CS ∈ [−1, 1]K×K , and
1. For any strategy y of the column player ∃i ∈ [K] such that e⊤
i
RS y > 1/2, and for any x of the
row player ∃ j ∈ [K] such that xCSe j > 1/2.
2. For any ε-WNE (x , y), let x˜  (x1 , . . . , xcK) and y˜  (y1 , . . . , ycK). The following holds:
(a) supp(x˜), supp(y˜) ⊆ S.
(b) | | x˜ − cUcK,S | |1 6 τε and | | y˜ − cUcK,S | |1 6 τε.
Parameter c in the above definition is needed for the quasi-polynomial lower bound. It is to
essentially imply that approximate NE strategy sets, while projected on first cK coordinates, are
disjoint and therefore they are disjoint before projection as well.
Given parameters 1/2 > δ > ε > 0, c ∈ [0, 1], and τ > 0, let (R, C) be an N × N game that is
degree t, (ε, δ)-SoSHard . And for K  poly(n) and S ⊂ [K] let (RS , CS) be an (ε, τ, c)-EnumHard
game of size K × K. Construct game (R′, C′) of size (N + K) × (N + K) as follows:
R′ 
[
R −2
δ RS
]
and C′ 
[
C δ
−2 CS
]
(4.1)
where the constants, namely δ and (−2), represent matrices of appropriate size with all entries
set to the stated constant.
Lemma 4.4 (Completeness). There’s degree t pseudo-equilibrium in the game (R′, C′) that gives a payoff
of 1 to both the players.
Proof. By construction of (R′, C′) togetherwith property (1) of a degree t, (ε, δ)-SoSHard game, we
know that there’s a pseudo-distribution of degree t on strategy profiles (x , y) that form an NE for
(R, C). This immediately yields a pseudo-distribution ˜ on strategyprofiles for the game (R′, C′) by
padding x and y with zeros on the last K coordinates. We claim that this is a pseudo-distribution
on NE of (R′, C′).
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Since ˜ is a pseudo-distribution on NE of (R, C), it satisfies the inequality constraints x⊤R′y >
e⊤
i
R′y for every i 6 N. Further, by property (1), the ˜ satisfies the constraint x⊤R′y > δ. On
the other hand, by construction of (R′, C′), e⊤
i
R′y 6 δ since y satisfies yi  0 for all i > (N + 1).
A similar argument shows that ˜ satisfies the inequality constraint x⊤C′y > x⊤C′ei for every
i 6 (N + K). This yields that ˜ satisfies the constraints of NE for (R′, C′) as required. 
To prove the soundness of the construction, we first need to show that every WNE of game
(R′, C′) is supported on the strategies of the EnumHard game.
Lemma 4.5. For 0 < ε′ < 2ε/3, every ε′-WNE (x , y) of game (R′, C′), we have supp(x), supp(y) ⊂
{(N + 1), . . . , (N + K)}.
Proof. Let us denote xL 
∑
i∈[N] xi , xR  (1 − xL), yL 
∑
i∈[N] yi and yR  (1 − YL). It suffices to
show that xL  yL  0. Suppose not, and xL > 0 or yL > 0. First we show that xL > 0 if and only
if yL > 0. By construction, if yL  0 then payoff of the row player from any i ∈ [N] is (−2) while
from any i > N it is δ > 0. In that case if xi is non-zero for an i ∈ [N] then it contradicts (x , y)
being ε-WNE . Therefore, xL  0. Similarly, xL  0⇒ yL  0 follows.
Next we show that if xL > 0 then it should be significantly bigger.
Claim 4.6. If xL > 0 then xL > 2/3. And if yL > 0 then yL > 2/3.
Proof. Let us prove the second part and the first part follows similarly. By property (1) of EnumHard
-game (RS , CS) there exists a j ∈ {(N + 1), . . . , (N + K)} such that payoff of the row player from
strategy j, namely e⊤
j
R′y, is at least δyL +
yR
2 . Therefore, if xL > 0 the strategy i ∈ [N] with xi > 0
should have payoff at least δyL +
yR
2 − ε′. On the other hand, payoff from any i 6 N is at most
yL − 2yR, implying.
yL − 2yR > δyL + 12 yR − ε′ ⇒ yL(1 − δ) > 2.5yR − ε ((because )ε > ε′)
⇒ yL(1 − δ) > 2.5 − 2.5yL − δ ((because )δ > ε)
⇒ yL(3.5 − δ) > 2.5 − δ ⇒ yL > 2/3 ((because )δ 6 1/2)

Let xˆ and yˆ be truncation of x and y to first N coordinates, and let xˆ′  xˆ/xL and yˆ′  yˆ/yL
be their normalized vectors. Then, row player’s payoff from i 6 N is e⊤
i
R yˆ − 2yR. Furthermore, if
xi > 0, then this payoffmust be at least maxk6N e
⊤
k
R yˆ−2yR− ε′ > maxk6N e⊤k R yˆ−2yR−2ε/3. This
implies, ∀i ∈ [N], xi > 0 ⇒ e⊤i R yˆ/yL > 1yL (maxk6N e⊤k R yˆ − 2ε/3) ⇒ e⊤i R yˆ′ > maxk6N e⊤k R yˆ′ − ε.
The last implication uses yL > 2/3 fromClaim 4.6. Similarly, we can show that if∀i ∈ [N], yi > 0⇒
xˆ
′⊤Cei > maxk∈[N xˆ′⊤Cei − ε. These two together implies that (xˆ′, yˆ′) is an ε-WNE of game (R, C).
Therefore, by property (2) of SoSHard games, xˆ′⊤(R+C)yˆ′ 6 2(δ− ε) ⇒ xˆ⊤(R+C)yˆ 6 (δ− ε)xL yL.
We have either xˆ⊤R yˆ < (δ − ε)xL yL or xˆ⊤C yˆ < (1 − εˆ)xL yL . We will show contradiction for
the former and the contradiction for the latter follows similarly by symmetry of the construction
of game (R′, C′).
Suppose, xˆ⊤R yˆ < (δ − ε)xL yL. There exists i ∈ [N] such that xi > 0 and e⊤i R yˆ < (δ − ε)yL.
Therefore, e⊤
i
R′y  e⊤
i
R yˆ − 2yR < (δ − ε)yL − 2yR. By property (1) of EnumHard game (RS , CS),
exists j > N such that e⊤
j
R′y > δyL +
yR
2 . By requirement of ε
′-WNE , payoff from strategy i above
should be at least payoff from j minus ε′. This gives,
(δ − ε)yL − 2yR > δyL +
yR
2
− ε′ > δyL +
yR
2
− ε ⇒ (1 − yL)ε > 2.5yR ⇒ ε > 2.5
A contradiction.

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Lemma 4.7 (Soundness). For 0 6 εˆ < ε/15 every εˆ2-NE (x , y) of game (R′, C′) satisfies | | x˜ −
(0N , cUcK,S)| |1, | | y˜ − (0N , cUcK,S)| |1 6 9(τ + 1)εˆ, where x˜ and y˜ are projection of x and y respectively on
first (N + cK) coordinates, and 0N is an N dimensional zero vector.
Proof. Note that additive scaling of payoffmatrices preserves approximateNE,whilemultiplicative
scaling scales the approximation factor by the same amount. Since every entry inR′, C′ are in [−2, 1]
we first add 2 to all of them and then divide them by 3. Thus, (x , y) is now εˆ2/3-NE of the scaled
game, which is also its εˆ2-NE. Lets denote the scaled game by (Rˆ, Cˆ).
Then by Lemma 4.1 property (4) there exists (x′, y′) that is 3εˆ-WNE of game (Rˆ, Cˆ), which is 9εˆ-
WNE of game (R′, C′). Note that 9εˆ < 2ε/3. Applying Lemma 4.5 we get that supp(x′), supp(y′) ⊆
{(N + 1), . . . , (N + K)}. Therefore, strategy (x′, y′) projected to last K coordinates is a 9εˆ-WNE
of game (RS , CS). The latter is an (ε, τ, c)-EnumHard game, whose property (2.a) implies | | x˜′ −
(0N , cUcK,S)| |1 6 9τεˆ, where x˜′ is the projection of x˜′ on first (N + cK) coordinates.
If we get an upper bound on l1 distance between x and x
′, then using triangle inequality we
will get an upper bound on l1 distance between x˜ and cUcK,S. By construction of (x′, y′), we have
that supp(x′) ⊆ εˆ-BR1(y) and supp(y′) ⊆ εˆ-BR2(x). Furthermore, Part (3) of Lemma 4.1 implies∑
i<εˆ-BR1(y) xi 6 εˆ and
∑
i<εˆ-BR2(x) yi 6 εˆ. While constructing x
′ from x we set the probability of
all strategies not in εˆ-BR1(y) to zero and redistribute their mass to strategies in εˆ-BR1(y) uniformly.
Therefore, | |x − x′ | |1 6 2εˆ. Finally, | | x˜ − (0N , cUcK,S)| |1 6 | |x − x′ | |1 + | | x˜′ − (0N , cUcK,S)| |1 6
(9τ + 2)εˆ. 
Using the SoSHard game and a family of EnumHard games on far-apart sets, next we construct
a family of hard games. The proof of the next theorem will crucially use Lemmas 4.7 and 4.4.
Theorem 4.8. Given parameters ε ∈ [0, 1/2), δ > ε, τ > 0, and c ∈ (0, 1]
(h1) let (R, C) be a degree t, (ε, δ)-SoSHard game of dimension N × N .
(h2) and for K  poly(N) and subsets S1, . . . , S f of [K] such that | |UK,Si − UK,S j | |1 > 18c (τ + 1)ε, let
(RSi , CSi) is a (ε, τ, c)-EnumHard game for each i ∈ {1, . . . , f }.
Then, for the game family F  {Gi | Gi is the game of (4.1) constructed using (R, C) and (RSi , CSi)},
1. All Gi ∈ F share a common pseudo-equilibrium of degree t.
2. For any pair of games Gi , G j ∈ F , their set of ε′-NE strategies of either players do not intersect, for
all 0 6 ε′ 6 (ε/15)2.
Proof. The first part for each game Gi follows from the first part of Lemma 4.4. For the second
part, let (x i , yi) and (x j , y j) be ε′-NE of games Gi and G j respectively. If we think of ε′  εˆ2
then clearly εˆ < ε/15 is satisfied. Let x˜ i , y˜i , x˜ j , y˜ j be projection of respectively x i , yi , x j , y j
on first (N + cK) coordinates. Using Lemma 4.7 we have | | x˜i − (0N , cUcK,Si )| |1 6 9(τ + 1) and
| | x˜ j − (0N , cUcK,S j )| |1 6 9(τ + 1). If x i  x j then x˜ i  x˜ j , and thereby using triangle inequality
of l1 norm we get | |UcK,Si − UcK,S j | |1 6 18c (τ + 1)ε, a contradiction to hypothesis (h2). The same
contradiction follows if y i  y j . 
5 Exponential Lower Bounds forNE
In order to prove hardness against using SoS relaxation together with enumeration, we need to
construct a family of games all of which share a common high degree pseudo-expectation for its
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ε-NE formulation 2.2, while their ε-NE strategy sets for either player are disjoint. In this section,
we obtain exponential hardness for 1/poly(n)-NE, and prove Theorem 2.14. It follows from the
following result.
Theorem 5.1 (Exponential Lower Bound forNE). For every n large enough, there’s a family of Γ  2Ω(n)
two-player games {Gi  (Ri , Ci)}Γi1 with O(n) pure strategies for both players and all payoffs in [−1, 1]
such that:
1. Completeness: All Gis share a degree Θ(n), pseudo-equilibrium.
2. Soundness: For any i , j if (x , y) and (x′, y′) are Θ(1/n4)-NE of games Gi and G j respectively
then x , x′ and y , y′.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows immediately from the following two constructions of hard
games along with the generic combining construction from Theorem 4.8.
Lemma 5.2 (Games Hard for SoS). There exists a degree Θ(n), (ε, δ)-SoSHard game (R, C) for ε 
O(1/n2), δ ∈ (0, 1/2] and R, C ∈ [−1, 1]O(n)×O(n).
Lemma 5.3 (Games Hard for Enumeration). For K  O(n), ε  O(1/n2), τ  O(n) and c  1, there
exists a family of subsets F ⊂ 2{0,1}K of size at least 2Ω(n) such that
• for each S ∈ F there is an (ε, τ, c)-EnumHard game (RS , CS) for RS , CS ∈ [−1, 1]K×K .
• for any pair of distinct S, S′ ∈ F , ‖UcK,S −UcK,S′ ‖ > 18c (τ + 1)ε.
5.1 SoSHard Game Construction
In Lemma 5.2, the SoSHard game has to encode degreeΘ(n) pseudo-equilibriumwith high payoff,
while no such approximate NE exists. Among the combinatorial problems, such SoS lower bound
is known for independent set. If we construct a game that encodes independent set in a NE with
high payoffs such that map from the independent set to corresponding NE is low degree then we
are done using Fact 5.6. This is exactly what we achieve in this section.
Given an undirected graph G on n vertices represented by an adjacency matrix E (abuse of
notation), we wish to check if it has an independent set of size k 6 n (k-IS). We will reduce this
problem first to finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game with certain property. In fact we
will show that the game has a NEwith payoff at least δ  (1+1/2k) if k-IS has a solution, otherwise
all it’s ε-WNE have payoff at most (δ − ε) for an inverse polynomial ε.
For γ  1/2, A  1n×n −E + γIn×n , B  −M ∗ In×n and B′  (k + γ) ∗ In×n , consider the following
(2n + 1) × (2n + 1) block matrices:
R 

A B
B′ 0n×n
(−1)12n×1
(1 + γk )11×2n 1

C 

A B′
B 0n×n
(1 + γk )12n×1
(−1)12n×1 1

(5.1)
In the above construction, submatrix A has entry one in (u , v)th position if edge (u , v) is not
present in graph G, otherwise the entry is zero. Further, all its diagonals are (1 + γ)  1.5. Note
that game (R, C) is symmetric, i.e., C  RT . For ease of notation let m  2n + 1.
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Lemma 5.4. If graph G has an independent set S ⊆ V of size k then strategy profile (x , x) where x 
(Un ,S , 0(n+1)) is a Nash equilibrium of game (R, C). Furthermore, payoffs of both the players at this NE is
(1 + 1/2k).
Proof. This is because payoff from each non-zero strategy is (1 + γ/k), and from strategies with
zero probability it is at most (1 + γ/k). 
The above lemma constructs a symmetric NE with high payoff. In what follows, we consider
non-existence of both symmetric and non-symmetric NE with high payoff when k-sized indepen-
dent set does not exist in the graph.
Lemma 5.5. Given that graph G does not have an independent set of size k, if (x , y) is an ε-WNE of game
(R, C) for ε 6 15k , then supp(x)  supp(y)  {(2n + 1)}.
Proof. To the contrary suppose supp(y) , {(2n + 1)}. This proof is based on a number of observa-
tions which we list next with a brief justification.
1. supp(y) ∩ {1, . . . , n} , ∅ and supp(x) ∩ {1, . . . , n} , ∅: If supp(y) ⊆ {(n + 1), . . . , (2n + 1)},
then supp(x)  {(2n + 1)} since any strategy other than the last one gives non-positive payoff
to player one, while the last one gives payoff of at least 1. In that case, by the same argument
supp(y)  {(2n + 1)}, a contradiction. Second part follows similarly.
2. ∀i 6 n , xi > 0 ⇒ yi > 1k − εγ , and yi > 0 ⇒ xi > 1k − εγ : For the first part, suppose xi > 0.
Row player’s payoff from ith strategy is e⊤
i
Ry 6 1 + γyi − ym . While mth strategy gives her
e⊤mRy > 1+ γ/k(1− ym). Since (x , y) is ε-WNE , the former payoff has to be at least the latter
payoff minus ε,
1 + γyi − ym > 1 +
γ
k
(1 − ym) − ε ⇒ γyi >
γ
k
+ ym(1 − 1
k
) − ε ⇒ yi > 1
k
− ε
γ
3. supp(x) ∩ {1, . . . , n}  supp(y) ∩ {1, . . . , n} and |supp(x) ∩ {1, . . . , n} 6 (k − 1): From Point
(2), supp(x) ∩ {1, . . . , n}  supp(y) ∩ {1, . . . , n} follows. For the second part, to the contrary
suppose |supp(x) ∩ {1, . . . , n}| > k. Since G has no independent set of size k, there exists
u , v ∈ supp(x) ∩ {1, . . . , n} such that edge (u , v) is present in G and in turn A(u , v)  0.
Sum of the payoffs of the row player from these two strategies are:
e⊤u Ry + e
⊤
v Ry 6 (2 − yu − yv) + γ(yu + yv)  2 −
(yu + yv)
2
6 2 − 1
k
+ 2ε
The last inequality uses the fact that from Point (2) that if xu , xv > 0 then yu , yv > 1k − εγ and
γ  1/2. Thus either strategy u or strategy v gives payoff at most (1 − 12k + ε). While the
payoff from mth strategy is at least 1. Then, ε-WNE ensures that (1− 12k + ε) > 1− ε ⇒ ε > 14k ,
a contradiction to ε 6 15k .
Let yL 
∑
i∈[n] yi and a  |supp(y) ∩ {1, . . . , n}| Then from Point (1) we have yL > 0 and from
Point (3)we have a 6 (k − 1). There exists strategies i , i′ ∈ supp(y) ∩ {1, . . . , n} such that yi 6 yL/a
and yi′ > yL/a. Again using Point (3) we have xi > 0 as well, and the corresponding payoff is
e⊤
i
Ry 6 yL + γyi − ym 6 yL + γyi 6 (1 + γ/a)yL, while the row player’s payoff from (n + i′)th
strategy is e⊤(n+i′)Ry  (k + γ)yi′ > (k + γ)yL/a. Therefore,
e⊤(n+i′)Ry − e⊤i Ry > (k/a + γ/a − 1 − γ/a)yL  (k − a)yL/a > yL/a >
a(mini∈[n] yi)
a
>
1
k
− 2ε > ε.
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The second last inequality follows using point (2) and (3), while the last follows using ε 6 15k .
This contradicts strategy i giving at least best payoff minus ε, i.e., contradiction to (x , y) being
ε-approximate well-supported equilibrium. 
Using Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 next we show that (R, C) gives an SoSHard game. Note that
R, C ∈ [−1, k].
We rely on a key result that is a variant of the one developed by Tulsiani [Tul09]. We include
an elementary proof in the appendix.
Fact 5.6 ([Tul09]). LetΨ1(x),Ψ2(y)  {11  0, 12  0, . . . , 1q  0, h1 > 0, h2 > 0, . . . , hr > 0} be two
systems of polynomial constraints in x ∈ n1 and y ∈ n2 , respectively.
Suppose there are polynomials f1, f2, . . . , fn2 of degree at most t, and sum-of-squares polynomial
Q1, Q2, . . . , Qr such that for every x that is feasible for Ψ1, y ∈ n2 defined by y j  f j(x) for every
j ∈ [n2] satisfies:
1. 1 j(y)  0 for every 1 6 j 6 q, and
2. h j(y)  Q j(y).
Then, if there exists a degree d pseudo-expectation satisfying the constraints of Ψ1, then there exists a
degree ⌊d/t⌋-pseudo-distribution satisfying the constraints ofΨ2.
Lemma 5.7. Given the combinatorial problem k-IS on graph G  (V, E) on n vertices, construct (R, C) as
per (5.1). Game 1k (R, C) is a degree Ω(n), (ε, δ)-SoSHard , where ε  15k2 and δ  ( 1k + 12k2 ).
Proof. First note that all payoff entries of game (R˜, C˜)  1k (R, C) are in [−1, 1]. For the completeness
property of an SoSHard game, note that solution to independent-set gives a Nash equilibrium of
(R˜, C˜)with payoff at least ( 1k +
γ
k2
)  δ (Lemma 5.4). Thus, pseudo-distribution for the independent
set can be mapped to one for Nash equilibrium using Fact 5.6 on reductions within SoS framework.
Furthermore, if the size of the independent set is fixed, then this map is low degree (Fact 5.6).
Finally, the known degreeΩ(n) SoS hardness for independent set of fixed O(n) size [Tul09], gives
degreeΩ(n) pseudo-equilibrium for game (R˜, C˜)with payoff δ.
The soundnessproperty followsusing Lemma5.5 sincewhenbothplayers play their last strategy,
they both get payoff 1k < (δ − ε). 
Lemma 5.7, the fact that k 6 n, together with the SoS hardness of independent set and Fact 5.6
give Lemma 5.2.
5.2 EnumHard Games Construction
In this section we prove Lemma 5.3. For this we construct an n × n EnumHard game for a given
subset S ⊂ [n]. Let |S |  m. We will first construct an m × m game whose O(1/m2)-WNE set is
near the uniform strategy.
Generalized Matching Pennies [DGP09]. This game was introduced in [DGP09], however, a
characterization of its approximate equilibria was not known to the best of our knowledge. Con-
sider a zero-sum two-player game with m strategies, where the row player wants to match with
the column player and the column player does not want to match. That is if both plays i ∈ [m]
then the row player one gets payoff 1 and the column player gets −1. Otherwise, both gets zero.
21
If I(m) denotes the identity matrix of size m then, the game essentially is (I(m),−I(m)). It is easy
to see that both players playing uniform random strategy is the only Nash equilibrium [DGP09].
Next we show that all ε-WNE are also near this unique NE.
Lemma 5.8. For 0 6 ε 6 1m if (x , y) is an ε-WNE of the generalized matching-pennies game (I(m),−I(m))
then | |x −Um | |1 6 mε and | |y −Um | |1 6 mε.
Proof. Wewill argue for x, and similar argument follows for y. It suffices to show that | |x−Um | |∞ 6
ε. To the contrary suppose ∃i ∈ [m] such that xi > 1/m + ε. Then ∃i′ ∈ [m] such that xi′ < 1/m.
In that case, i < ε-BR2(x) and therefore yi  0. This would imply existence of a j ∈ [m] such that
y j >
1
(m−1) > ε. Now note that row player’s payoff from strategy j is y j > ε while from strategy i it
is zero. Therefore i < ε-BR1(y), a contradiction to (x , y) being an ε-WNE . 
For any given S ⊆ [n]with |S |  m, consider the following n × n game (RS , CS).
Dummy strategies: ∀i < S, ∀ j ∈ [n] set RS(i , j)  CS( j, i)  −1.
Matching pennies: ∀i , j ∈ S, set RS(i , j)  I(m)(i , j) + 1 and CS(i , j)  −I(m)(i , j) + 3.
Rest: ∀i ∈ S, ∀ j < S set RS(i , j)  1 and CS( j, i)  2.
Normalization: Divide RS by 2, and CS by 3.
(5.2)
Lemma 5.9. For any given S ⊆ [n], game (RS , CS) of (5.2) is (ε, τ, c)-EnumHard for any ε 6 13n , τ  3n,
and c  1.
Proof. By constructionpayoffs in (RS , CS) are in [−1, 1], and both players get payoff at least 1/2 from
any strategy i ∈ S no matter what the opponent is playing. Therefore, property (1) of EnumHard
game (Definition 4.3) is satisfied.
Let |S |  m 6 n. For property (2), note that no matter what the opponent is playing, payoff
from strategy i < S is at most −1/3 which is way less than the payoff of 1/2 from any strategy i ∈ S.
Therefore, if (x , y) is an ε-WNE , then supp(x), supp(y) ⊆ S. Therefore, strategy profile (x′, y′),
the projection of (x , y) on to coordinates of set S, gives a 3ε-WNE of the matching pennies game
(I(m),−I(m)). Thereby using Lemma 5.8 it follows that | |x − Un ,S | |1  | |x′ −Um | |1 6 3εm 6 3εn.
Since | |x−Un ,S | |1  | |x′−Um | |1 6 3εn, and this upper bound is τε in property (2), τ  3n suffices.
Similarly we can show | |y −Un ,S | |1 6 τε. 
Finally to enable construction of a family of EnumHard games, we will need the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.10. For any two sets S, S′ ⊆ [n], S , S′, | |Un ,S −Un ,S′ | |1 > 1n .
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose |S | > |S′|, then ∃i ∈ S \ S′. Therefore, | |Un ,S −Un ,S′ | |1 >
Un ,S(i) > 1|S | > 1n . 
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 5.3 using Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. We will construct a family of n × n EnumHard games. For every subset S ⊆ [n],
construct an n × n game (RS , CS) as per (5.2). Lemma 5.9 implies that (RS , CS) is an (ε, τ, c)-
EnumHard game for ε 6 1
60n2
, τ  3n, and c  1. Furthermore, for any two distinct sets S, S′ ⊆ [n],
Lemma 5.10 implies | |Un ,S −Un ,S′ | |1 > 1n > 18c (τ + 1)ε. 
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6 Quasipolynomial Hardness for Finding Approximate Equilibria
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 2.18. We restate it for convenience.
Theorem 6.1 (Quasi-polynomial Hardness for Approximate NE). For every n large enough, there’s
a family of Γ  nΩ(log (n)) two-player games {(Ri , Ci)}Γi1 with n pure strategies for both players and all
payoffs in [−1, 1] such that:
1. Completeness: All Gis have a common degree Θ(log (n)), pseudo-equilibrium.
2. Soundness: For a fixed ε  O(1), for any i , j and any pair of ε-NE in Gi, G j, say (x , y) and (x′, y′)
respectively, x , x′ and y , y′.
The proof follows immediately from the following two constructions of hard games along
Theorem 4.8.
Lemma 6.2 (Games Hard for SoS). There exists a degree Ω(log (n)), (ε, 1)-SoSHard game (R, C) for
ε  O(1) and R, C ∈ [−1, 1]n×n .
Lemma 6.3 (Games Hard for Enumeration). For K  O(n), ε  O(1), τ  O(1) and c  1/2, there
exists a family of subsets F ⊂ 2{0,1}K of size at least KΩ(log(K)) such that
• for each S ∈ F there is an (ε, τ, c)-EnumHard game (RS , CS) for RS , CS ∈ [−1, 1]K×K .
• for any pair of distinct S, S′ ∈ F , ‖UcK,S −UcK,S′ ‖ > 18c (τ + 1)ε.
6.1 Constructing an SoSHard game
We will next show construction of SoSHard game for a constant ε > 0. In [DFS16], the authors
give a reduction from 3SAT to finding constant-approximate Nash equilibrium maximizing social
welfare up to some additive slack. This reduction maps a n variable, O(n)-clause 3SAT instance
into a 2O(
√
n) size two-player game. This gives a quasi-polynomial lower bound for the latter
problem, assuming that n-variable, O(n)-clause 3SAT instances require exponential time to solve.
We simply observe that their reduction is low-degree, that is, the map that takes any satisfying
assignment of the starting 3SAT instance into an approximate equilibrium maximizing social
welfare is a polynomial of degree O(√n). Combined with Fact 5.6 as in the previous section, we
immediately obtain the SoSHard game as required. Our reduction will in fact yield hardness of
finding the weaker solution concept of ε-WNE (thus implying the hardness of ε-NE).
Lemma 6.4 (SoS Hardness for Finding Payoff Maximizing ε-NE). There exists a game (R, C) for
R, C ∈ [−1, 1]N×N such that
1. Completeness: There’s a degree Ω(log (N)), pseudo-equilibrium for (R, C) that has payoffs for both
players at least 1.
2. Soundness: For every ε-NE (x , y) of (R, C), both row and column players have an individual
payoff of at most (1 − ε) for ε < 1/1200.
For completeness, we sketch the argument of Deligkas-Fearnley-Savani [DFS16] next. The
starting point is the hardness of approximation for the 3SAT problem. To show ETH-hardness,
one has to start from a (worst-case hard) instance of 3SAT and applies the PCP theorem to get
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a hard-to-approximate instance. For SoS-hardness, we only need such a result to hold for the
SoS algorithm. As a result, we can rely on Grigoriev’s theorem to get exponential SoS-hardness
of approximating 3SAT. One can think of this as saying that ETH is unconditionally true when
restricted to the SoS framework and, in fact, the hard instance is simply a random one!
Fact 6.5 (Grigoriev’s Theorem). Let φ be a random instance of 3SAT with m  Θ(n/ε2) constraints and
n variables. Then, with probability at least 1 − 1/n,
• For every x ∈ {0, 1}n , the fraction of clauses satisfied in φ by x is at most 7/8 + ε, and
• there exists a degree Θ(n) pseudo-distribution over the satisfying assignments for the instance φ.
Given a hard instance of 3SAT, one transforms it into a 2 prover, free game.
Recall that a two prover game is defined by a distribution D over a finite set of question pairs
(Q1, Q2) with a collection of admissible answer pairs and two players Alice and Bob. In a run of
the game, the referee draws a question pair (Q1, Q2) from D and sends Q1 to Alice and Q2 to Bob
and receives answers from them and accepts if the answer pair is in the list of admissible answer
pairs for (Q1, Q2). A two prover game is said to be free if D is a product distribution.
A strategy for a two prover game is a pair of functions f1 and f2 that maps questions to an
answer. The value of the strategy is the probability that ( f1(Q1), f2(Q2)) belongs to an admissible
answer pair for the question pair (Q1, Q2) picked at random from D.
Definition 6.6 (FreeGame from 3SAT). Let φ be a 3SAT instance from Fact 6.5 with m clauses and n
variables. Let the clauses and variables appearing in φ each be partitioned into
√
n different groups,
say, S1, S2, . . . , S√m and T1, T2, . . . , T√n , respectively. Then, φ defines a free game as follows:
Let D be the uniform distribution on (Si , T j) for i ∼ [
√
m], j ∼ [√n] define the distribution on
questionpairs. For (Si , T j), an admissible answer pair is an assignment to the variables appearing in
each clause in Si and each variable in T j such that 1) every clause in Si is satisfied by the assignment
chosen 2) for every variable that appears in some clause in Si and in T j, the assignments given by
the answer pairs match.
Note that the number of strategies for Merlin 1 are at most N1  2
3
√
m and that for Merlin 2, at
most N2  2
√
n .
The free game F can be thought of as a cooperative two player game as follows. The row
player has as their strategies the set of all ordered pairs of questions to Merlin 1 and admissible
answers for that question. Similarly, the column player has as strategies, all possible questions to
Merlin 2 and admissible answers for those questions. Finally, a pair of ordered pairs of questions
and answers receive a payoff of 1 (for both row and column player) iff the verifier accepts the two
answers on those two questions and 0 otherwise. Observe that the size of the cooperative game
produced from a free game is at most
√
mN1 ×
√
nN2.
The following completeness result holds for every free game produced from 3SAT instances
from Fact 6.5.
Lemma 6.7 (SoS Completeness for Free Game). Let φ be the 3SAT instance with m  Θ(n/ε2) clauses
and n variables from Fact 6.5. Let F be the free game constructed in Definition 6.6 from φ. Then, there’s a
pseudo-equilibrium of degree Θ(n) for the cooperative game defined by F with payoff for each player  1.
Proof. We will start from the pseudo-distribution of degree Θ(n) given to us by Fact 6.5 that
satisfies every constraint of φ and use Fact 5.6. To do this, we need to build a low-degree map
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from any satisfying assignment x of φ to a strategy for theMerlins in the free game F . This is very
simple: for any question set (Si , T j) - the strategy is described by a bit string of length 3
√
m and√
n respectively - where the bit string corresponds to the assignment for the variables appearing
in the clauses in Si and variables in T j respectively. For the strategy for the cooperative game we
use the following mixed strategy: Merlin 1 chooses a question from X uniformly at random and
then chooses the answer corresponding to the assignment x for that question. Similarly, Merlin 2
chooses a question from Y uniformly at random and then chooses the answer corresponding to x
for that questions. Using xi as the assignment for the variable i wherever it appears gives a degree
1 map into strategies of F .
It is easy to see that since x (purportedly) satisfies all constraints of φ, it satisfies all clauses in
Si and further, the assignments to variables appearing in both Si and T j match. Thus, we obtain
a degree 1 map from any satisfying assignment x into a strategy for F with value 1. Further, it
is easy to see (since the maximum possible payoff in the game is 1) that the strategy constructed
above satisfies all constraints of being an NE. Thus, we have exhibited a degree O(√n) map from
any satisfying assignment x to a NE of the cooperative game associated with F . By Fact 5.6, we
immediately obtain a pseudo-distribution of degreeΘ(n) on strategies with value 1 for F .

The following soundness result holds for the partitions S1, S2, . . . , S√m and T1, T2, . . . , T√n
chosen appropriately (we invite the reader to find the details of the reduction in Deligkas-Fearnley-
Savani [DFS16]):
Fact 6.8 (Soundness, [DFS16]). There is no strategy forF produced from φ in Fact 6.5 with value exceeding
1 −Ω(1).
Deligkas-Fearnley-Savani give a construction of a game (R′, C′) by taking the cooperative game
(R, C) produced from the free game as above and using it to fill the first √mN1 ×
√
nN2 block
and then adding H rows and columns for H being 2|Y | ≈ 2
√
n . The off diagonal blocks are filled
with a carefully constructed zero sum game and its transpose. Finally, the bottom diagonal H × H
block is filled with the all zero matrix. It is immediate from the simple argument above that the
pseudo-equilibriumdescribed above forF is in fact a ε-approximate pseudo-equilibrium in (R′, C′)
- the only required fact in this argument is that the equilibrium strategy y (x respectively) satisfy∑
b y(y , b)  1 for every question y to Merlin 2. This is a linear polynomial equality constraint that
carries over to the pseudo-distribution in a straightforward way.
We omit the simple and standard argument here and summarize the result that immediately
follows below:
Fact 6.9 (Corollary of [DFS16]). Let F be a free game with √m (√n, respectively) possible questions and
N1 (N2, respectively) possible strategies for Merlin 1 (2, respectively.) Then, for ε  O(1) there’s a two
player game with
√
m · N1 strategies for the row player and
√
n · N2 strategies for the column payer such
that:
1. Completeness: There’s a ε-approximate pseudo-equilibrium of degree Θ(n) = Ω(log (N1 + N2))
where both players receive a payoff of at least 1.
2. Soundness: For every ε-approximate NE of the game, the payoff of either player is at most (1 − ε)
for ε < 1/1200.
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6.2 Constructing a family of EnumHard games
In this section we prove Lemma 6.3 by constructing a family of EnumHard games for a constant ε.
Essentially, we will construct a family of two-player games, each parameterized by a subset S of
strategies such that: (i) bothplayers’ strategies atNash equilibrium is largely supportedon the set S,
and (i i) for a constant ε, all its ε-WNE are near the actual NE.Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [DP09]
gave a construction that ensures row-player’s all WNE strategies are near the uniform distribution
over the subset. Constructing such a game for n lo1(n) carefully selected subsets, they showed non-
existence of an oblivious PTAS for WNE that uses only Verification Oracle 2.9, i.e., checks if given
strategy profile is a WNE . However, in their construction the column player’s NE (WNE ) strategies
are common across games. Therefore it breaks under our more powerful Verification Oracle 2.12,
i.e., given any one player’s strategy the oracle checks if there exists a ε-NE corresponding to the
given strategy.
Since we need hardness against Oracle 2.12, construction of [DP09] can not be used directly.
We will have to ensure that, for each player, her NE strategy sets are far apart across games. Our
construction builds on that of [DP09], and therefore first we discuss the latter and its result.
Construction of [DP09]. Let l be an even integer and n 
( l
l/2
)
. For each S ⊂ [n] of size l, we
will construct an n × n game. Fix such a subset S, and denote the corresponding game by (AS , BS).
In this game, row player cares about only strategies from S, i.e., strategies outside of S are strictly
dominated by that of S. Since |S | is l, number of (l/2) sized subsets of S are exactly n. The n
strategies of the column player correspond to these (l/2) sized subsets of set S. In other words, if
S1, . . . , S( ll/2) are all the (l/2) subsets of S, then think of column player’s strategies being indexed
by these subsets. The payoffs in column j, corresponding to subset S j of S, are:
• For each i < S, set AS(i , j)  −1 and BS(i , j)  1.
• For each i ∈ S ∩ S j, set AS(i , j)  1 and BS(i , j)  0.
• For each i ∈ S \ S j, set AS(i , j)  0 and BS(i , j)  1.
Theorem 6.10. [DP09]
(a) For any given ε < 1, if (x , y) is an ε-WNE of game (AS , BS), then (i) for all i < S, xi  0, and (i i)
| |x −Un ,S | |1 6 8ε.
(b) For V  {Un ,S | S ⊆ [n], |S |  l} we have |V |  Ω(n0.8 log2 n). And for any γ > 0 there
exists V′ ⊂ V of size Ω(n(0.8−2γε) log2 n) such that for any two vectors Un ,S ,Un ,S′ ∈ V′ we have
| |Un ,S′ −Un ,S | |1 > γε.
Note that, column player playing each of its n strategies uniformly at random is her NE strategy
in game (AS , BS) for all S ⊂ [n] of size l. Thus querying Oracle 2.12 with strategy y  Un for the
column player will return a NE of (AS , BS). To prevent this next we extend this construction that
uses the above game combined with another copy of it where roles of the two players are switched.
For the construction to work as desired, we need both players to put non-trivial probability mass
on both games, and to achieve this we augment this game with a matching-pennies game type
construction.
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Our Construction. Again fix an even integer l and let n 
( l
l/2
)
. Fix an l sized subset S ⊂ [n], and
corresponding game (AS , BS) as described above. We construct a 2n × 2n game (RS , CS) as follows:
if we think of matrices of this game as 2 × 2 block matrix, each block of size n × n, then
RS 
[
2 + AS −2
−2 2 + B⊤
S
]
CS 
[ −2 + BS 2
2 −2 + A⊤
S
]
(6.1)
In (6.1), the constants 2 and −2 represents block matrices of size n × n with all entries set to
2 and −2 respectively. For any strategy profile (x , y) of game (RS , CS), let us divide each of x
and y into two vectors corresponding to first n and last n strategies. These are xL  (x1, . . . , xn),
xR  (x(n+1) , . . . , x2n), yL  (y1, . . . , yn), and yR  (y(n+1) , . . . , y2n). For any vector v, we will use
σ(v) to denote sum of its coordinates (∑i vi).
Using the matching pennies property of game (RS , CS), next we show that both xL and xR have
enough probability mass, and similarly yL and yR.
Lemma 6.11. For an ε ∈ [0, 1), let (x , y) be an ε-WNE of game (RS , CS). Then, 919 − ε9 6
σ(xL), σ(xR), σ(yL), σ(yR) 6 1019 + ε9 .
Proof. First we show that σ(xL), σ(xR), σ(yL), σ(yR) > 0. To the contrary suppose σ(xR)  0, then
column player gets payoff at most−1 from any stragety j 6 n, while gets payoff of 2 from any k > n.
Therefore σ(yL)  0. In that case, the row player gets payoff at most −1 from any i 6 n, while gets
at least 2 payoff from any h > n. Since there exists i 6 n such that xi > 0, this contradicts (x , y)
being ε-WNE . Similar argument follows for each of σ(xL), σ(yL), σ(yR) being zero.
Next we will argue that 919 − ε9 6 σ(yL) 6 1019 + ε9 , and then using σ(yR)  1 − σ(yL) the
inequalities will follow for σ(yR) as well. For this we need properties of payoffs from AS and BS
blocks of RS.
Claim 6.12. For all k 6 n we have e⊤
k
AS y
L
6 1 and e⊤
k
B⊤
S
yR 6 1, and there exists an i , i′ 6 n such
that e⊤
i
AS y
L
>
σ(yL)
2 and e
⊤
i′ B
⊤
S
yR >
σ(yR)
2 .
Proof. The first part follows by the fact that coordinates of both AS and BS are at most one. For
the second part, note that for each column j ∈ [n] of AS exactly (l/2) coordinates are 1 out of l
coordinates of S. Therefore, summing up payoffs corresponding to strategies of S, we have∑
i∈S
e⊤i AS y
L

∑
j6[n]
y
L ∗ (l/2)  σ(yL)(l/2)
Since |S | is l, among the strategies of S there is at least one i ∈ S such that e⊤
i
AS y
L
>
σ(yL)
2 . For
the second part, a row of B⊤
S
is a column of BS. Note that every entry in BS is at least zero, and in
a column all entries corresponding to rows in S are one. Let us divide yR further into coordinates
corresponding to set S, namely yR,S, and those outside S, namely yR,S¯. In block BS the role of first
player is that of column-player in game (AS , BS). Therefore, strategies (n + 1), . . . , 2n correspond
to the n 
( l
(l/2)
)
subsets of S. There is one such set that correspond to largest (l/2) coordinates of
yR,S . Let this be Si′. Then, e
⊤
i′ B
⊤
S
yR > σ(yR,S¯) + σ(yR,S)/2 > σ(yR)/2. 
Consider i , i′ 6 n as in Claim 6.12. Since σ(xL), σ(xR) > 0, there exists h , h′ 6 n such that
xh , x(n+h′) > 0. Row player’s payoffs from strategies i , (n + i′), h , and (n + h′) are:
e⊤
h
RS y  2σ(yL) + e⊤h AS yL − 2σ(yR), e⊤(n+i′)RS y  −2σ(yL) + e⊤i′ B⊤S yR + 2σ(yR)
e⊤
i
RS y  2σ(yL) + e⊤i AS yL − 2σ(yR), e⊤(n+h′)RS y  −2σ(yL) + e⊤h′B⊤S yR + 2σ(yR)
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Since (x , y) is an ε-WNE we must have e⊤
h
RS y > e
⊤
(n+i′)RS y − ε and e⊤(n+h′)RS y > e⊤i RS y − ε.
Using Claim 6.12, the former gives,
3σ(yL) − 2σ(yR) > −2σ(yL) + σ(y
R)
2 + 2σ(yR) − ε ⇒ 5σ(yL) > 92σ(yR) − ε
⇒ σ(yL) > 910σ(yR) − ε5  910 (1 − σ(yL)) − ε5
⇒ (1 + 910 )σ(yL) > 910 − ε5
⇒ σ(yL) > 919 − 219 ε > 919 − ε9
Similarly, using e⊤(n+h′)RS y > e
⊤
i
RS y − ε together with Claim 6.12 we will get σ(yR) > 910σ(yL) − ε5 .
Simplifying this using σ(yR)  1 − σ(yL) gives σ(yL) 6 1019 + ε9 .
Bounds on σ(xL) and σ(xR) can be obtained through similar arguments for the payoff of the
column-player w.r.t. CS. 
For any ε < 1 the bounds obtained in Lemma 6.11 implies lower bound of at least 13 and upper
bound of at most 23 on the each of σ(xL), σ(xR), σ(yL), and σ(yR).
Lemma 6.13. For an ε ∈ [0, 1/3), let (x , y) be an ε-WNE of game (RS , CS). Then, ( xLσ(xL) ,
yL
σ(yL) ) and
( y
R
σ(yR) ,
xR
σ(xR) ) are 3ε-WNE of game (AS , BS).
Proof. If xi for an i 6 n, then it must be the case that e⊤i RS y > e
⊤
k
RS y− ε for all k 6 n. This implies,
e⊤i AS y
L
> e⊤k AS y
L − ε ⇒ e
⊤
i
AS y
L
σ(yL) >
e⊤
k
AS y
L
σ(yL) −
ε
σ(yL) ⇒ (e
⊤
i AS
yL
σ(yL) ) > (e
⊤
k AS
yL
σ(yL) ) − 3ε
The last inequality follows using Lemma 6.11. Similarly, we can argue that if y j > 0 for a j 6 n,
then for all k 6 n we have ( xL⊤
σ(xL)BSe j) > ( x
L⊤
σ(xL)BSek) − 3ε. These two together implies ( x
L
σ(xL) ,
yL
σ(yL) )
is a 3ε-WNE of game (AS , BS).
In the lower diagonal block, the game is (BT
S
, AT
S
), or in other words the roles of the two
players are switched. Therefore, it follows that if xi > 0 for an i > n then for all k > n we have
(BT
S
yR
σ(yR) ei)  (
yR
⊤
σ(yR)BSei) > (
yR
⊤
σ(yR)BSek) − 3ε. And similarly, if y j > 0 for j > n then for all k > n
we have (e⊤
j
AS
xR
σ(xR) ) > (e⊤k AS x
R
σ(xR) ) − 3ε. These two together implies (
yR
σ(yR) ,
xR
σ(xR)) are 3ε-WNE of
game (AS , BS). The lemma follows. 
The above lemma together with Theorem 6.10 implies that for any ε-WNE (x , y), vector xL is
near uniform distribution over strategies of S scaled by σ(xL). In order to show non-overlapping
equilibrium sets across games corresponding to different S, we will need that xL is near such a
uniform distribution scaled by 12 . For this we need a tighter upper-lower bound on σ(xL), that
we show next. The main missing component here is a tighter upper bound on the payoffs from
(AS , BS) proved in the next lemma.
Lemma 6.14. For an ε ∈ [0, 1/3), if (x , y) is an ε-WNE of game (RS , CS), then ∀i 6 n , (e⊤i AS yL) 6
σ(yL)
2 +4ε and (xL
⊤
BSei) 6 σ(x
L)
2 +4ε. And similarly, (e⊤i B⊤S yR) 6
σ(yL)
2 +4ε and (e⊤i ASxR) 6
σ(xR)
2 +4ε
for each i ∈ [n].
Proof. Let x˜  x
L
σ(xL) and y˜ 
yL
σ(yL . Lemma 6.13 implies that (x˜ , y˜) is a 3ε-WNE of game (AS , BS).
Then due to Theorem 6.10 part (a), we have x˜i  0 for all i < S. Since sum of the payoffs for rows
in S is always 1 in this game, we have x˜⊤⊤(AS + BS)y˜  1. There are two possible scenarios:
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Case I - x˜⊤AS y˜ 6 12 . Then it must be the case that ∀i 6 n , (e⊤i AS y˜) 6 12 + 3ε, or else (x˜ , y˜) is
not a 3ε-WNE of (AS , BS). Multiplying by σ(yL) gives, (e⊤i AS yL) 6
σ(yL)
2 + σ(yL)3ε 6
σ(yL)
2 + 2ε
for each i ∈ [n]. The last inequality uses σ(yL) 6 23 from Lemma 6.11.
To get similar bound on (xL⊤BSei), note that Claim 6.12 gives existence of i ∈ [n] such that
(e⊤
i
AS y˜) > 12 . Therefore x˜⊤AS y˜ > 12 − 3ε, implying x˜⊤BS y˜ 6 12 + 3ε. Therefore, again 3ε-WNE
condition gives that for each i ∈ [n] we should have (x˜⊤BSei) 6 12 + 6ε. Through similar analysis
as above we would get that for each i ∈ [n], (xL⊤BSei) 6 σ(x
L)
2 + 4ε.
Case II - x˜⊤BS y˜ 6 12 . Again by similar analysis as Case I, we will get that for each i ∈ [n] we
have (e⊤
i
AS y
L) 6 σ(y
L)
+
4ε and (xL⊤BSei) 6 σ(x
L)
2 + 2ε.
The second part follows similarly using the fact that ( y
R
σ(yR) ,
xR
σ(xR) ) is also a 3ε-WNE of game
(AS , BS) from Lemma 6.13. 
Now we are ready to prove a tighter lower/upper bound on σ(xL), σ(xR), σ(yL), σ(yR).
Lemma 6.15. Given an ε ∈ [0, 1), if (x , y) is an ε-WNE of game (RS , CS) then 12 − ε 6
σ(xL), σ(xR), σ(yL), σ(yR) 6 12 + ε.
Proof. The proof follows similar argument as of the proof of Lemma 6.11. We will first show the
claim for σ(yL) and thereby it will follow for σ(yR) as well since yR  1 − yL. Let i , i′ ∈ [n] be the
indices fromClaim 6.12. Let h , h′ ∈ [n]be such that xh , x(n+h′) > 0. Then, (e⊤h RS y) > (e⊤(n+i′)RS y)−ε
gives
2σ(yL)+(e⊤i AS yL)−2σ(yR) > −2σ(yL)+(e⊤i′ B⊤S yR)+2σ(yR)−ε ⇒ 4σ(yL)+
σ(yL)
2
+ε > 2σ(yR)+σ(y
R)
2
−ε
The last inequality uses (e⊤
i
AS y
L) 6 σ(y
L)
2 + 4ε from Lemma 6.14. Simplifying the above gives
σ(yL) > σ(yR) − 2ε ⇒ σ(yL) > 12 − ε. Similarly, simplifying (e⊤(n+h′)RS y) > (e⊤i RS y) − ε by making
use of (e⊤
i
AS y
L) > σ(y
L)
2 from Claim 6.12 and (B⊤S yR) 6
σ(yR)
2 + 4ε from Lemma 6.14, we get
σ(yL) 6 12 + ε.
Bounds for σ(xL), σ(xR) follows using similar argument for the payoffs of the columnplayer. 
Nowwe are ready to show that vector xL and yR corresponding to any ε-WNE are near uniform
distribution on set S scaled by 1/2.
Lemma 6.16. For an ε ∈ [0, 1/3), if (x , y) is an ε-WNE of game (RS , CS), then (i) supp(xL), supp(yR) ⊆
S, and (i i) | |xL −Un ,S/2| |1 6 17ε and | |yR −Un ,S/2| |1 6 17ε.
Proof. From Lemma 6.13 we have that (xL/σ(xL), yL/σ(yL)) is a 3ε-WNE of game (AS , BS). Then
part (a) of Theorem 6.10 implies supp(xL) ⊂ S and | |xL/σ(xL) − Un ,S | |1 6 24ε. Multiplying by
σ(xL) gives | |xL − σ(xL)Un ,S | |1 6 σ(xL)24ε. Using the fact that σ(xL) > 12 − ε from Lemma 6.15, we
get | |xL − 12Un ,S | |1 − ε 6 16ε ⇒ ||xL − 12Un ,S | |1 6 17ε.
Similarly, using (yR/σ(yR), xR/σ(xR)) being a 3ε-WNE of game (AS , BS) from Lemma 6.13,
together with part (a) of Theorem 6.10 and lower bound (1/2 − ε) on σ(yR) from Lemma 6.15, we
can show that supp(yR) ⊆ S and | |yR − 12Un ,S | |1 6 17ε. 
Recall that our final goal is to construct a family of EnumHard games for appropriate parameters
of ε, τ and c such that their ε-WNE do not intersect for a constant ε. Note that all payoff entries of
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an EnumHard game (Definition 4.3) are in [−1, 1], and the first requirement is that no matter what
the opponent plays, a player always has a strategy that gives at least half payoff. In order to ensure
these we need to scale game (RS , CS) additive and multiplicatively by a constant. The third part
requires renaming of the strategies of the column player so that vectors yL and yR get swapped.
∀i ∈ [2n], ∀ j ∈ [n], R˜S(i , j)  (RS(i , n + j) + 3)/6, R˜S(i , n + j)  (RS(i , j) + 3)/6,
C˜S(i , j)  (CS(i , n + j) + 3)/6, C˜S(i , n + j)  (CS(i , j) + 3)/6 (6.2)
Lemma 6.17. For an ε ∈ [0, 1/26), τ  102 and c  1/2, game (R˜S , C˜S) is an (ε, τ, c)-EnumHard game.
Proof. By construction, every entry in (AS , BS) is either 0, 1 or −1, and thereby from (6.1) every
entry in (RS , CS) is in [−3, 3]. Thus, R˜S , C˜S ∈ [−1, 1]. Note that we have swapped the first n and
last n strategies of the column player. This is just renaming of the strategies.
For property (1) of the EnumHard game, consider i and i′ of Claim 6.12. Note that the proof of
this claim does not use ε-WNE property of profile (x , y). For any given profile y of the column-
player, the payoff of the row player from strategy i is:
(e⊤i R˜S y)  1/6σ(yL) + 5/6σ(yR) + 1/12σ(yR) >
13
12
(1/2 − ε) > 1/2
The last inequality follows using ε < 1/26. Similarly, we can show that no matter what the
row-player plays, column player has a strategy that gives at least 12 payoff.
For Property (2) let (x , y) be an ε-WNE of game (R˜S , C˜S). Then, for y′  (yR , yL), (x , y) is a
6ε-WNE of game (RS , CS). Then, part (i) of Lemma 6.16 ensures supp(xL), supp(yL) ⊂ S implying
Property (2.a) of EnumHard game. While the second part ensures | |xL − 12Un ,S | |1, | |yL − 12Un ,S | |1 6
17(6ε)  102ε implying Property (2.b). 
Constructing a family. Finally, to apply Theorem 4.8, its hypothesis (h2) requires a family of
EnumHard games parameterized by set S with certain properties. Using the EnumHard game of the
previous section next we will construct such a family with nO(log(n)) many games. The next lemma
follows simply using part (2) of Theorem 6.10.
Lemma 6.18. Let S  {S ⊂ [n] | |S |  l} and ε < 10−5. There exists (n0.75 log(n)) sized subset S′ of S
such that for any S, S′ ∈ S′, S , S′, we have | |Un ,S −Un ,S′ | |1 > 18c (τ + 1)ε, where τ  102 and c  1/2.
Now we have all ingredients now to prove Lemma 6.3.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Set ε < 10−5, τ  102 and c  1/2 like in Lemma 6.18. The lemma implies
existence of a family of subsets S′ of set [n] such that | |Un ,S −Un ,S′ | |1 > 18c (τ + 1)ε. For every set
S ∈ S′ we know that |S |  l. Therefore, game (R˜S , C˜S) of (6.2) where (RS , CS) is from (6.1), is an
(ε, τ, c)-EnumHard due to Lemma 6.17. By construction, we have (R˜S , C˜S) ∈ [−1, 1]n×n . 
References
[ABS15] Sanjeev Arora, Boaz Barak, and David Steurer, Subexponential algorithms for unique
games and related problems, J. ACM 62 (2015), no. 5, Art. 42, 25. MR 3424199 1
30
[AGMS11] Bharat Adsul, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, and Milind Sohoni, Rank-1 bimatrix games: A
homeomorphism and a polynomial time algorithm, ACM Symposium on the Theory of
Computing (STOC), 2011, pp. 195–204. 1
[AIM14] Scott Aaronson, Russell Impagliazzo, and Dana Moshkovitz,AMwith multiple merlins,
IEEEConference onComputational Complexity, IEEEComputer Society, 2014, pp. 44–
55. 13
[AKV05] Tim Abbott, Daniel Kane, and Paul Valiant, On the complexity of two-player win-lose
games, IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2005, pp. 113–
122. 1
[ALSV13] Noga Alon, Troy Lee, Adi Shraibman, and Santosh Vempala, The approximate rank
of a matrix and its algorithmic applications, STOC’13—Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
SymposiumonTheory ofComputing,ACM,NewYork, 2013, pp. 675–684.MR3210829
3
[AOW15] Sarah R. Allen, Ryan O’Donnell, and David Witmer, How to refute a random CSP, 2015
IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science—FOCS 2015,
IEEE Computer Soc., Los Alamitos, CA, 2015, pp. 689–708. MR 3473335 1
[ARV09] Sanjeev Arora, Satish Rao, and Umesh Vazirani, Expander flows, geometric embeddings
and graph partitioning, J. ACM 56 (2009), no. 2, Art. 5, 37. MR 2535878 1, 2
[Bar15] Siddharth Barman, Approximating Nash equilibria and dense bipartite subgraphs via an
approximate version of Caratheodory’s theorem, ACM Symposium on the Theory of Com-
puting (STOC), 2015, pp. 361–369. 1
[BBH+12] Boaz Barak, Fernando G. S. L. Brandão, Aram W. Harrow, Jonathan Kelner, David
Steurer, and Yuan Zhou, Hypercontractivity, sum-of-squares proofs, and their applications
[extended abstract], STOC’12—Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, ACM, New York, 2012, pp. 307–326. MR 2961513 1
[BBKK18] Boaz Barak, Zvika Brakerski, Ilan Komargodski, and Pravesh K. Kothari, Limits on low-
degree pseudorandom generators (or: Sum-of-squares meets program obfuscation), Advances
in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2018 - 37th Annual International Conference on the
Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Tel Aviv, Israel, April 29 -
May 3, 2018 Proceedings, Part II, 2018, pp. 649–679. 1
[BHK+16] Boaz Barak, Samuel B. Hopkins, Jonathan A. Kelner, Pravesh Kothari, Ankur Moitra,
and Aaron Potechin, A nearly tight sum-of-squares lower bound for the planted clique
problem, Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 23 (2016), 58.
1, 13
[BKS14] Boaz Barak, JonathanA. Kelner, andDavid Steurer,Rounding sum-of-squares relaxations,
STOC, ACM, 2014, pp. 31–40. 1, 2
[BKS15] Boaz Barak, Jonathan A. Kelner, and David Steurer, Dictionary learning and tensor
decomposition via the sum-of-squares method [extended abstract], STOC’15—Proceedings
of the 2015ACMSymposiumonTheory ofComputing, ACM,NewYork, 2015, pp. 143–
151. MR 3388192 1
31
[BKS17] Boaz Barak, Pravesh K. Kothari, and David Steurer, Quantum entanglement, sum-of-
squares and the log-rank conjecture, Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC (2017).
1
[BKW14] Mark Braverman, Young Kun-Ko, and Omri Weinstein, Approximating the best nash
equilibrium in no(log n)-time breaks the exponential time hypothesis, Electronic Colloquium
on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 21 (2014), 92. 13
[BKW15] Mark Braverman, Young Kun Ko, and Omri Weinstein, Approximating the best Nash
equilibrium in no(lo1n)-time breaks the exponential time hypothesis, ACM-SIAM Annual
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2015, pp. 970–982. 2
[BM16] Boaz Barak and Ankur Moitra, Noisy tensor completion via the sum-of-squares hierarchy,
COLT, JMLRWorkshopandConferenceProceedings, vol. 49, JMLR.org, 2016, pp. 417–
445. 1
[BR17] YakovBabichenko andAviadRubinstein,Communication complexity of approximateNash
equilibria, ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), 2017. 1
[BRS11] Boaz Barak, Prasad Raghavendra, and David Steurer, Rounding semidefinite program-
ming hierarchies via global correlation, 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Founda-
tions of Computer Science—FOCS 2011, IEEEComputer Soc., Los Alamitos, CA, 2011,
pp. 472–481. MR 2932723 1, 2
[BS] Boaz Barak and David Steurer, Proofs, beliefs, and algorithms through the lens of sum-of-
squares, Note for the course co-taught by Boaz Barak and Pablo Parrilo at Harvard-MIT,
and David Steurer and Pravesh Kothari at Princeton. 4
[CDT09] X. Chen, X. Deng, and S.-H. Teng, Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash
equilibria, Journal of the ACM 56(3) (2009). 1, 8, 10, 15
[CS08] Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm, New complexity results about Nash equilibria,
Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008), no. 2, 621–641. 2
[DFS16] Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, and Rahul Savani, Inapproximability results for ap-
proximate nash equilibria, 12th International Conference Web and Internet Economics
(WINE), 2016, pp. 29–43. 2, 10, 13, 23, 25
[DGP09] C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg, and C. H. Papadimitriou, The complexity of computing a
Nash equilibrium, SIAM Journal on Computing 39(1) (2009), 195–259. 1, 21, 22
[DP09] Constantinos Daskalakis and Christos H. Papadimitriou, On oblivious PTAS’s for Nash
equilibrium, ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), 2009, pp. 75–84.
1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 26
[FFT16] Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Oblivious rounding and the inte-
grality gap, APPROX-RANDOM, LIPIcs, vol. 60, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
fuer Informatik, 2016, pp. 8:1–8:23. 2, 6, 9
[GLS81] M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, and A. Schrĳver, The ellipsoid method and its consequences in
combinatorial optimization, Combinatorica 1 (1981), no. 2, 169–197. MR 625550 5
32
[GS11] VenkatesanGuruswami and Ali Kemal Sinop, Lasserre hierarchy, higher eigenvalues, and
approximation schemes for quadratic integer programming with PSD objectives, Electronic
Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 18 (2011), 66. 1
[GW01] Michel X.Goemans andDavid P.Williamson,Approximation algorithms forMAX-3-CUT
and other problems via complex semidefinite programming, STOC, ACM, 2001, pp. 443–452.
2
[GZ89] I. Gilboa and E. Zemel, Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations,
Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989), 80–93. 1, 2, 3, 14
[HK11] Elad Hazan and Robert Krauthgamer, How hard is it to approximate the best Nash equi-
librium?, SIAM Journal on Computing 40 (2011), no. 1, 79–91. 2, 13
[HL18] Samuel Hopkins and Jerry Li, Mixture models, robustness and sum-of-squares, Arxiv
(2018). 1
[HNW16] Aram W. Harrow, Anand V. Natarajan, and Xiaodi Wu, Tight SoS-degree bounds for
approximate Nash equilibria, Computational Complexity Conference (CCC), 2016. 1, 2,
3, 9, 10
[HSS15] SamuelB.Hopkins, JonathanShi, andDavid Steurer,Tensor principal component analysis
via sum-of-square proofs, COLT, JMLR Workshop and Conference Proceedings, vol. 40,
JMLR.org, 2015, pp. 956–1006. 1
[KKM18] Adam Klivans, Pravesh K. Kothari, and Raghu Meka, Efficient algorithms for outlier-
robust regression, Conference on Learning Theory, COLT (2018). 1
[KMOW17] Pravesh K. Kothari, Ryuhei Mori, Ryan O’Donnell, and David Witmer, Sum of squares
lower bounds for refuting any CSP, Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT
Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017, Montreal, QC, Canada, June 19-23,
2017, 2017, pp. 132–145. 1
[KS18a] Pravesh K. Kothari and Jacob Steinhardt, Better agnostic clustering via relaxed tensor
norms, Arxiv (2018). 1
[KS18b] Pravesh K. Kothari and David Steurer, Outlier-robust moment estimation via sum-of-
squares, Arxiv (2018). 1
[KT10] Ravi Kannan and Thorsten Theobald, Games of fixed rank: A hierarchy of bimatrix games,
Economic Theory 42 (2010), no. 1, 157–174, Preliminary version appeared in SODA’07,
and available at arXiv:cs/0511021 since 2005. 1, 3
[Las01] Jean B. Lasserre, Global optimization with polynomials and the problem of moments, SIAM
Journal on Optimization 11 (2001), no. 3, 796–817. 5
[Li13] Shi Li, A 1.488 approximation algorithm for the uncapacitated facility location problem, Inf.
Comput. 222 (2013), 45–58. 3
[LMM03] Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, and Aranyak Mehta, Playing large games using
simple strategies, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, pp. 36–41. 1, 2, 3, 9
33
[MP91] N. Megiddo and C. H. Papadimitriou, On total functions, existence theorems and compu-
tational complexity, Theor. Comput. Sci. 81 (1991), no. 2, 317–324. 1
[MSS16] TengyuMa, Jonathan Shi, andDavid Steurer,Polynomial-time tensor decompositions with
sum-of-squares, CoRR abs/1610.01980 (2016). 1
[NWY00] Yuri Nesterov, Henry Wolkowicz, and Yinyu Ye, Semidefinite programming relaxations
of nonconvex quadratic optimization, Handbook of semidefinite programming, Internat.
Ser. Oper. Res. Management Sci., vol. 27, Kluwer Acad. Publ., Boston, MA, 2000,
pp. 361–419. MR 1778235 5
[OZ12] Ryan O’Donnell and Yuan Zhou, Approximability and proof complexity, Proceedings of
the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SIAM,
Philadelphia, PA, 2012, pp. 1537–1556. MR 3202997 1
[Pap94] C. Papadimitriou, On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of
existence, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 48(3) (1994), 498–532. 1
[Par00] Pablo A Parrilo, Structured semidefinite programs and semialgebraic geometry methods in
robustness and optimization, Ph.D. thesis, Citeseer, 2000. 5
[RRS16] Prasad Raghavendra, Satish Rao, and Tselil Schramm, Strongly refuting random csps
below the spectral threshold, CoRR abs/1605.00058 (2016). 1
[RS09] Prasad Raghavendra and David Steurer,How to round any CSP, 2009 50th Annual IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2009), IEEE Computer Soc.,
Los Alamitos, CA, 2009, pp. 586–594. MR 2648437 2
[Rub16] AviadRubinstein, Settling the complexity of computing approximate two-playerNash equilib-
ria, IEEEAnnual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2016, pp. 258–265.
1, 3
[Sho89] N. Z. Shor, Nonsmooth optimization and dual bounds, Nonsmooth optimization and re-
lated topics (Erice, 1988), EttoreMajorana Internat. Sci. Ser. Phys. Sci., vol. 43, Plenum,
New York, 1989, pp. 403–410. MR 1034072 5
[SvS06] Rahul Savani and Bernhard von Stengel, HardâĂŘtoâĂŘsolve bimatrix games, Econo-
metrica 74 (2006), no. 2, 397–429. 1
[TS07] Haralampos Tsaknakis and Paul Spirakis,An optimization approach for approximate Nash
equilibria, Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2007, pp. 42–56. 1
[Tul09] Madhur Tulsiani, CSP gaps and reductions in the lasserre hierarchy, STOC, ACM, 2009,
pp. 303–312. 13, 14, 21
34
A Reductions Within Sum-of-Squares
Proof of Fact 5.6. Let µ˜(x) be a degree d pseudo-distribution satisfing the constraints ofΨ1(x). Let
ν˜(y) be a signed measure on n2 defined by the associated expectation functional: ˜ν˜[q(y)] 
˜µ˜[q( f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fn2(x)) for every polynomial q. Observe that if the degree of q is a, then the
degree of q(y(x)) for y(x)  ( f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fn2(x)), is at.
We claim that ν˜ is a degree ⌊d/t⌋-pseudo-distribution satisfying the constraints ofΨ2.
First, observe that since ˜ν˜ is a linear operator, ˜ν˜ is a well-defined linear operator. Let us now
verify the remaining properties.
First, consider any polynomial of the form q 
∑
i ri1i where ri are arbitrary polynomials and
de1(ri) + de1(1i) is at most ⌊d/t⌋ in y. Then, q(y(x)) has degree at most d in x. Further, for every
j, we know that 1 j(y(x))  0. Thus, ˜ν˜(y)
∑
i ri1i(y)  ˜µ˜(x)
∑
i ri1i(y(x))  0.
Next, consider any polynomial q 
∑
i ri1i +
∑
i si hi for arbitrary polynomials ri and sum-of-
squares polynomials si such that each term appearing in the expansion has syntactic degree of at
most ⌊d/t⌋.
We have: ˜ν˜(y)
∑
i ri1i +
∑
i sihi  ˜µ˜(x)
∑
i ri(y(x))1i(y(x)) +
∑
i si(y(x))hi(y(x)).
Now, 1i(y(x))  0 for every i. Further, hi(y(x))  Qi(y(x)) for some sum-of-squares polynomial
Q in y. This alsomeans thatQi(y(x)) is a SoS polynomial in x. Finally, since si is a SoS polynomial in
y, si(y(x)) is a SoS polynomial in x. Finally, product of SoS polynomials is SoS, thus, si(y(x))hi(y(x))
must also be SoS.
Now, using that ˜µ˜(x) is a valid pseudo-expectation of degree d completes the proof.

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